

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**THE EVOLUTION OF NATO:
THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND ITS
PREDECESSORS, 1945-2000**

by

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June 2000

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
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
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
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
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A review of European and transatlantic history since World War II suggests that the Cold War largely determined the foreign and security policies of Euro-Atlantic nations and of such international organizations as NATO. In the late 1980s, dramatic changes in Europe put an end to the Cold War deadlock and caused the transformation of NATO.

NATO's origins reside in the era of 1919-1948. Formed in 1948/49 as a collective defense institution, NATO's purposes, procedures and capabilities were adjusted to deter the Warsaw Pact threat. Since 1990 the organization appears to be the sole one still capable of dealing with current and future risks and threats of the transition processes. The thesis analyses NATO's path from confrontation to cooperation in view of NATO's evolution, beginning with NATO from its Cold War strategies, through the revolutionary changes due to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (Rome, 1991), and ending in the present with the outcome of the Alliance's Strategic Concept (Washington, 1999). The thesis assesses NATO's potential for further improvements and NATO's future role as an organization shaping the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A review of European and transatlantic history since World War II suggests that the Cold War largely determined the foreign and security policies of Euro Atlantic nations and of such international organizations as NATO. Starting in the late 1980s the dramatic political, economic, and social changes in Europe, marked by the fall of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the transition processes in Russia, put an end to the Cold War deadlock and caused the transformation of NATO.

The decline of Russia not only changed the balance of power between the superpowers but also had an enormous impact on all the other nations, directly or indirectly affected by the bipolar world. Social tensions and political instabilities still accompany the transition processes of the post-communist states in Europe. New crises and challenges have strongly influenced the policy of Western European nations in the last decade. Many new security risks have been driven by conflicts within states and the violence of non-state actors. Motives, objectives, and interests have broken through the scheme of the East-West confrontation.

NATO's origins reside in the era of 1919-1948, built upon the experiences of the League of Nations and World War II, on one hand, and the beginning of the Cold War on the other hand. Formed as a collective defense institution in 1948/49, NATO's purposes, functions, procedures, and capabilities were adjusted to deter the Warsaw Pact threat and created an effective protection of the Western world against the Warsaw Pact.

Although NATO has lost the Warsaw Pact as its main threat, the organization appears to be the sole one still relevant for dealing with current and future risks,

challenges, and threats of the transition processes. NATO is the world's only multinational, integrated, and strategically and operationally effective alliance at the disposal of political leaders.

What are the reasons for this? What are the great advantages of NATO in view of the experiences since the end of the Cold War? What makes NATO so valuable?

This thesis analyses NATO's development in view of current and future risks and challenges. It focuses on revised purposes, functions, procedures and capabilities due to the fundamental changes in the Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved at the Washington Summit of April 1999.¹

NATO has entered the 21st century as an alliance in transition. It remains, based on the 1949 Washington Treaty, a voluntary organization of sovereign nations committed to participate in collective defense should deterrence fail, but the transatlantic Alliance has taken on additional roles as the spearhead of an emerging cooperative Euro-Atlantic security system. NATO has started an internal and external adaptation process, which is yet not completed. The decisions made at the Washington Summit in April 1999 have helped to determine how NATO will process into the 21st century.

The main argument of this thesis is that NATO member-states have successfully adapted NATO structures, purposes, decision-making processes, and capabilities to future challenges and risks despite differences in basic national strategies. All member nations are aware of the benefits they gain from membership. The nations have been able to overcome their different interests to strengthen the ties of common norms and values and

to accept the burdens of agreement. This phenomenon is based on the ideal of the primacy of political authority, which has always determined the Alliance's policy and is best shown by the Washington Treaty and the outcomes of the Alliance's various Strategic Concepts, which are the guidelines and cornerstone of NATO's policy.² The deterioration of the security situation in the Balkans (1990-1999) accelerated the decision-making process for the adjustment of NATO, as other crises and developments did this in the decades before. Looking back at the history of NATO it is remarkable how past strengths and weaknesses influences NATO's present ability, or inability to adapt to the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. Several basic problems remain unsolved. The 1999 Strategic Concept did change the course of NATO. The organization became more flexible. At the same time it revealed the limits of consensus, as did the previous five Strategic Concepts.³

Chapter II: The phenomenon of flexibility and adaptability of NATO policy can be explained by three basic influencing factors - NATO's basic ideals as a community of values, NATO's capability to adapt its strategies and, the development of Europe's security environment. These three spheres analyzed below. This outlines the basis for NATO's acceptance of changes and serves as the starting point for several summit decisions in the period of transition between 1989 and 1999.

¹ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

² NATO Press Release, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, in: NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, Brussels, 1999

³ DC 6/1, MC 14/1, MC 14/2, MC 14/3, Alliance's New Strategic Concept [Rome, 1991], in: Gregory W. Pedlow, [Chief Historical Office Shape], NATO Strategy Documents: 1949-1969, in: NATO archives, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

Chapter III: As an alliance of democracies, NATO, more than other past and present military organizations, relies on public and parliamentary support. The New Strategic Concept, therefore, had to serve three fundamental functions. First, it had to create a framework for transformation and to provide convincing arguments for the public as well as partners. Second, it had to strengthen the ties among member nations and to convey convincingly NATO's main purpose of promoting security and stability for Europe as a whole. Third, it had to define a straightforward setting for military and political planners within NATO.

To visualize NATO's path from confrontation to cooperation it is necessary to analyze the inter-linked approaches in NATO's process of transformation, beginning with the cornerstone, the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (Rome, 1991), and ending, for the present, with the Alliance's Strategic Concept (Washington, 1999). How did NATO, facing new and unpredictable risks and challenges, change course?

Chapter IV: NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999, was the largest meeting of heads of state and government ever held, with forty-four countries represented. The leaders of the nineteen Alliance nations were present, including the three new members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as well as the leaders of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which includes twenty-five partner nations. The Summit was a symbol of confidence that NATO, born to respond to a Cold War threat, will have an important future in the international environment of the 21st century. It was an opportunity to celebrate NATO's fifty years of success and, more importantly, to lay the foundation for the future with a clear articulation of the reasons for

NATO's continued existence, a new Strategic Concept reflecting contemporary security conditions and requirements, and a clear definition of NATO's open-door policy.

In addition to the Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO member-states approved, ratified, and made public numerous other documents. To get all the facets of the Washington Summit coordinated, consensus had to be found on various critical issues. Although at the beginning of the Summit critical points were still in dispute, a consensus was established with a margin of freedom of interpretation. It is important to understand from which direction the old and the new member-states approached the accepted compromise.

The key document of this Summit was the Alliance's Strategic Concept. It provides a common basis for further institutional, national, and multinational developments and clarifies NATO's security policy. But within the documents are a huge number of unanswered questions regarding the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Some critical issues were deliberately excluded or formulated in a more general way, open to national interpretation, and the celebratory mood masked a number of quite divergent perspectives.⁴ The Washington Summit displayed the same strengths and weaknesses as before the end of the Cold War and the transition period from 1989 to 1999. The strengths permitted adaptation and the weaknesses continue to present problems, e.g.

⁴ Such as: NATO's purposes, fundamental security tasks and geographic scope; UN mandate for NATO to justify non-Article 5 operations; NATO's relationship with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean nations; NATO and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); NATO and its open-door-policy; National force capabilities and NATO force standards; the role of nuclear assets and the WMD policy.

skirting of hot topics. Does the present Concept provide the necessary answers to make NATO suitable for the political and military challenges ahead?

Chapter V - Conclusion: The necessary improvements to be achieved in order to fulfill NATO's own demanding claims can be derived from the main deficiencies and achievements of the new Strategic Concept. This provides an outlook for NATO's role in the 21st century on the basis of the current and estimated security situation and the results of the 1999 Washington Summit.

II. NATO – FROM COLD WAR TO COOPERATION

A. COMMUNITY OF COMMON NORMS

Based on the political culture of the Western World each NATO member state has established its own national, legal, social, and economic structures for the benefit of its population according to the principles of democracy, rule of law, personal freedom, and market economy.⁵

To promote inner stability and welfare in the North Atlantic region, however, there must also be the willingness and the convincing capability to afford independence and protection within the scope of individual and collective self-defense.

It is all together appropriate that nations so deeply conscious of their common interests should join in expressing their determination to preserve their present peaceful situation and to protect it in the future... In this treaty, we seek to establish freedom from aggression and from the use of force in the North Atlantic community. This is the area, which has been at the heart of the last two world conflicts. To protect this area against war will be a long step toward permanent peace in the whole world.⁶

This system of international cooperation and common representation of interests, which is based on the sovereignty of equal states, presupposes a certain self-

⁵ "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.", in: NATO Press Release, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, 1999, Brussels, Article 2, p. 395

⁶ Draft of President Truman's speech at the signing ceremony, 1 April 1949, Truman Library, available (online): <www.trumanlibrary.org/nato/doc6.htm> [March 2000]

understanding of every state as regards its national legitimacy, identity and the definition and pursuance of its national goals. It also requires a broad consensus about values, and the responsible use of power and force for political purposes, which is still a demanding challenge.

The international foreign and security policy pursued by the NATO states is based on four principles, derived from the ideas of the League of Nations and from the first experiences with the newly created United Nations (UN):⁷

1. The principle of democratic legitimacy
2. The principle of general cooperation among sovereign states
3. The principle of collective promotion of common interests
4. The principle of the indivisible security of all members

With a view to the development of solid, transatlantic and global security structures those principles had to provide the starting points for the development of an expandable and adaptable understanding of security.

...the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. ...the aim of the Allies is to promote peaceful and friendly relations throughout the North Atlantic Area... The Organization provides the forum in which they [member countries] consult together on any issue they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security. It provides the structures to facilitate consultation and cooperation between them, in political, military and economic as well as scientific and other non-military fields.⁸

⁷ N.N., Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Sicherheitspolitischer Reader, III Quarter 1997, pp. 84-91, 1997

The founding fathers believed that the method of achieving unity through the voluntary association of different countries dedicated to a common cause is the only way of bringing order into the troubled world. The desire of the nations to find a common approach to peace and prosperity has been advanced. This desire is basically caused by the fruitless experiences with the League of Nations (1919-1939), the catastrophic outcome of two world wars, the rising, but then disappointing, hopes, connected with the creation of the UN, and rising tensions in Europe caused by undesirable political, economic, and military developments.

The nations that signed the Treaty of Washington in April 1949 at first hoped to establish an international force for the use of the UN in preserving peace throughout the world, but the Soviet policy and their role in the Security Council put a stop to this idea at an early stage. Nevertheless the ideal to maintain international peace and security was the basis for the Washington Treaty and this explains the close link between the principles of the UN and NATO.⁹ Although NATO is bound to the United Nations Charter it is not subject to the right of veto of the UN Security Council. NATO is neither a sub-organization of the United Nations, nor is it a supranational organization with binding competence vis-à-vis its member nations.

⁸ N.N., NATO Handbook, On-line-library, 1998 Edition, Core Functions, available (online): www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v003.htm [March 2000]

⁹ President Harry S. Truman, Draft of President Truman's speech at the beginning ceremony, with his handwritten corrections, 1 April 1949, in: Truman Library NATO documents, available (online): www.trumanlibrary.org/nato/doc6.htm [March 2000]

The Alliance's spirit of consensus, its military effectiveness, its multi-nationality, and its transatlantic link best illustrate what makes NATO's performance so unique and ageless.

The spirit of consensus, the willingness to compromise, to give and take for the overall best interest:¹⁰ NATO's modes of operation are built on the acceptance of the primacy of political authority and on the respect for the equal, sovereign decision competence of each member state. Based on the idea of primacy of political authority, fundamental decisions are reached on the basis of regular consultations in the highest political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). For reasons of transparency those decisions are unclassified.

The Alliance's solidarity is based on an open exchange of opinion and continuous consultation and cooperation in political, military, economic, and other fields.

However, the consultation and coordination mechanisms of the national security interests do not relieve the individual members from their democratic responsibility towards their own nation. In the end the capacity to act depends on everybody's ability to agree on a proposal, and nations' ability to hold the position in view of the motions and interests of the public. This is a real challenge in view of the great diversity of languages, cultures, religions, historical backgrounds, and national interests. It is NATO's strength to permit adaptation and it is its weakness, which continue to present problems.

Military effectiveness: Military capabilities are an indispensable element at the disposal of the political decision making bodies. The already in times of peace

functioning, integrated NATO military structure leads to more harmonized national positions regarding the readiness and capability of defense.

It is a fundamental prerequisite for a security alliance whose credibility relies, not only on the political will to act, but on the capabilities of its military structure. Military effectiveness means having a clear-cut, accountable chain of command with unambiguous responsibilities. In this regard it is important that nations have respect for the integrity of the NATO military command structure and trust in its ability to protect their vital interests as well as the forces they provide for mission taskings.¹¹

The standards in military capabilities are set by the strategic concepts, subordinate directives of the NATO Military Committee, and matching national documents. There are constant adaptations to the task spectrum and to technological developments, and also to budgetary limits and political constraints.

Multi-nationality and the transatlantic link: From the beginning NATO had to balance different national positions. Re-nationalization of security policy has been averted through consultation and cooperation, and mediation in internal conflicts has averted the risk of open hostilities between the member-states. The role and meaning of individual member-states have often changed, but the U.S. leading role within the Alliance has remained. This leadership has been to the benefit of all members. It has supported the Western European State's recovery, it has secured America's influence in

¹⁰ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, NATO at Fifty: Future Challenges, Historic Tasks, available (online): <www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0399/ijpe/pj19kell.htm>, pp. 3-4 [March 2000]

¹¹ Nicholas Kehoe, Sustaining a vibrant Alliance, NATO Review-Web Edition, vol.46, No.2, Summer 1998, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-04.htm> ,pp. 10-13 [March 2000]

world politics, especially in Europe, and it has prevented the U.S. from yielding to isolationist or unilateral tendencies.

...NATO needs North America, and North America needs NATO. Europe is inextricably linked to North America's vital interests, both economic and security. The logic goes something like this: peace and stability in Europe create the conditions for economic growth and economic growth is what creates the opportunity for prosperity. Peace and stability are fundamental prerequisites for prosperity. So, the transatlantic link equates to mutual interests.¹²

Against this background the opportunities and risks of the Alliance are obvious. NATO-internal risks emanate from the plurality of opinions, especially with regard to the absence of the Cold War as a cohesive factor and the varying national assessments and perceptions of crises and risks.¹³ The opportunities, internal as well as external, are to be found in the credibility of the Alliance as a union of free democratic nations of shared values and common interests. Despite its internal problems, it can unite its members against risks from outside. It unites the economically most important and militarily most potent nations of the world against unpredictable and diverse transformation processes.

The draft statement of President Truman on the NATO anniversary celebration, three years after its founding (1952) discusses three basic lessons learned of history. First, nations cannot find peace just by sitting around and hoping that war does not happen. Second, no country can expect peace if it decides to look after itself and forget

¹² Nicholas Kehoe, Sustaining a vibrant Alliance, NATO Review – Web Edition, vol.46, No.2, Summer 1998, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-04.htm> pp.10-13 [March 2000]

¹³ David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p. XII

about its neighbors. And third, peace cannot be achieved unless NATO is strong.¹⁴ The translation of these basic lessons into a broad policy containing political, military, economic, and social aspects has been the key to NATO's success:

War endangers freedom, undermines morality, destroys wealth, restricts opportunity, and holds back social progress... We don't want to win another war; we want to prevent it. To me, that is the supreme goal of the North Atlantic Treaty. ...We have only begun to realize the full possibilities of democratic society and of peaceful international cooperation... We want a world in which individuals as well as nations can be secure and prosperous and can live with their neighbors in freedom and confidence.¹⁵

If NATO had been only a military Alliance focused solely on the Cold War, it would have lost its foundation and energy with the beginning of the transformation processes. NATO's consistency and performance are founded on the combination of primacy of political authority, respect for national interests, and democratic processes. NATO has often hesitated to act directly on crisis situations owing to internal debates, but once it reaches consensus it acts with resolve. The success of NATO, therefore, is due to the political and military pillars of NATO.¹⁶

¹⁴ N.N., Draft Statement For President Truman On The NATO Anniversary [third] Celebration, 1952, available (online): <www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/anniversary_statement/anniversary_statement.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁵ N.N., Draft Statement For President Truman On The NATO Anniversary [third] Celebration, available (online): <www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/anniversary_statement/anniversary_statement.htm>

¹⁶ Javier Solana, NATO beyond Enlargement, in: *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, edited by Anton A. Bebler, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 1999, pp. 3-9

B. DOCTRINES – FORWARD STRATEGY, MASSIVE RETALIATION, AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The Alliance brought together the European and North American nations and benefited from the coalition-building effects. NATO functioned as a primary vehicle by which coherent policies and programs were developed and carried out through coalition mechanisms. The result was a performance that ebbed and flowed in response to the Cold War's dynamics.

NATO started with a political idea — a U.S. commitment to Europe — and with a strategy of containment and deterrence, and pursued this policy and strategy through the decades of the Cold War.¹⁷

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, established the basis for the development of a comprehensive strategy, the development of structures, procedures, and military strategies.¹⁸

Article 9 of the Treaty initiated the process of creating the Alliance's organizational political structures. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was established, which then itself called up to establish a Defense Committee (DC - forum of the Defense Ministers of each nation). This Committee was to recommend measures for the implementation of Article 3 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, which cover the build up of

¹⁷ Lord Ismay, *NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954*, Bosch - Utrecht, Netherlands, 1954, p. 10

¹⁸ Gregory W. Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents: 1949-1969*, in: NATO archives, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000] and Christian Greiner, *Von der massiven Vergeltung zur flexiblen Antwort*, in: *Truppenpraxis / Wehrausbildung*, April 1997, German MOD, Armed Forces Staff I 1, pp. 254-261; and Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford-England, 1998, pp. 35-50

individual and collective capacities for collective defense and resistance to armed attack. The NAC also established the Military Committee (MC) composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the member-states. Aside from this political structure, the Alliance did not have an integrated military command structure at that time. Instead, there were five provisional Regional Planning Groups.¹⁹

The MC, supporting the DC, in December 1949 worked out the first overall Alliance strategy. The first Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, in short DC 6/1, wanted to encourage the greatest possible cooperation and coordination among the military forces of NATO member nations.²⁰ Its purpose was clear and short: to establish an effective defense posture for NATO in the face of a clearly perceived threat from the Soviet Union. As a result, deterrence and defense became the main pillars of the organization. One of the key factors was the use of nuclear weapons to defend the North Atlantic area, due to the fact that conventional forces could not offer credible resistance to the Soviet forces.

This strategy had to be modified and replaced several times during the 1950s, in response to political developments, changes in the military balance, and technological developments. In 1950 MC 14, which provided guidance for force planning in support of the strategy, was approved.²¹ DC 6/1 and its temporary successor documents were

¹⁹ Lord Ismay, NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954, Bosch - Utrecht, Netherlands, 1954, pp. 68-81

²⁰ DC 6/1 - The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area - 1 December 1949, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

²¹ MC 14 - Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning - 28 March 1950, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

replaced in December 1952 by MC 14/1, Strategic Guidance, which outlined the strategic basis for planning and coordination.²² Starting with the process of developing, in 1956, a substantially changed strategy, MC 14/2 superseded its predecessor in 1957.²³ Its main purpose was to respond to a major attack by the immediate use of the Alliance's nuclear weapons — the strategy of massive retaliation. Just as the former strategies lost their sense and credibility, MC 14/2 had to be replaced. With the Soviet Union catching up in the nuclear arms race, the strategy became controversial. The integration of West Germany into the Alliance structures, which improved the conventional armed forces structure in Europe in terms of quantity and quality, offered the opportunity to react to the Soviet threat in a dual approach. The MC 14/3 strategy, approved in 1967, introduced the concept of flexible response, based on the assumption that deterrence and defense could maintain a balance of forces for credible collective defense.²⁴ Based on this military balance, the Harmel Report, approved in the same year, underlined the Alliance's commitment to achieve progress in seeking détente through dialogue with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.²⁵ Both, the Harmel Report and the new military strategy of flexible response gave the Alliance a new internal and external orientation.

²² MC 14/1 – Strategic Guidance – 9 December 1952, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

²³ MC 14/2 – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area – 23 May 1957, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

²⁴ MC 14/3 - Overall Strategic Concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area – 16 January 1968, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

²⁵ Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution - A Crisis of Credibility 1966-1967*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 320-386

Détente became the second pillar of NATO. This concept proved valid for more than 20 years. With Germany's reunification and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Central Europe at the beginning of the 1990s the Cold War ended. NATO assumed new tasks while maintaining the old values. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Alliance introduced its New Strategic Concept, in 1991, providing an extended notion of security and adding the element of cooperation.²⁶ This Strategic Concept has been the first unclassified one in NATO's history. Due to the fundamental changes in the 1990s, the Alliance's New Strategic Concept was replaced by the Alliance's Strategic Concept in April 1999.²⁷

Through the evolution of NATO five main fundamental principles have endured in the strategic concepts: the primacy of political authority, the importance of collectivity and solidarity, the purely defensive nature of the Alliance, the emphasize on deterrence and war prevention, the reliance on nuclear weapons, and the concept of forward defense.

Over the decades NATO had to demonstrate its ability to change and adapt, clearly evident in the rising numbers of NATO pillars and changes in strategy.

The Alliance succeeded in establishing the parameters under which the member-states still accept obligations and find compromises for resolving problems.

Nonetheless, especially the military strategies, and their transformation into strategic guidance's, — the footprints of NATO — were strongly disputed. This has to be

²⁶ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 7-8 November 1991, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm> [March 2000]

²⁷ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

seen in historical context. Three major changes in NATO's commitment to strategy during the Cold War period can be identified: the DC 13, adopted by NAC on 1 April 1950; the MC 14/2, approved on 9 May 1957; and the MC 14/3, approved on 12 December 1967. These steps in strategy have to be placed in historical context, in order to understand the flexibility and adaptability, but also the temporary discord, of NATO. NATO's past strengths and weaknesses still influences its present ability to adapt to the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. The historical experiences are the foundation for NATO's strength and weakness today.

1. The Beginning of NATO and Its First Strategy

Between 1947 and 1949 a series of dramatic threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, and Turkey, confrontations in the Middle East, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and, beginning in April 1948, the Blockade of Berlin, brought a reorientation of Western policy towards the Soviet Union.²⁸ The policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which started in the spirit of compromise and accommodation, resulted in a containment policy.²⁹

²⁸ Ernest R May, *Lessons of the Past*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973, pp. 19-51

²⁹ "Lessons of the past greatly influenced the Washington's vision of the future. Determined to avoid mistakes, which, in their view, had caused World War II, American planners sought to disarm defeated enemies, give peoples of the world the right to shape their own future, revive world trade, and replace the League of Nations with a new and more effective collective security organization." in: John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 354; *The Cold War has been a result of complicated internal and external processes and interactions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. More about this in John Lewis Gaddis, chapter I, IX, X, and XI. The political adviser of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan, analyses of Soviet foreign policy: 22 February 1946, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol.VI, pp. 696-709; and George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, "The Long Telegram", Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1967, pp. 547-559; Kennan's recommendations on the*

The predominant goal of containment was to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its power and to prevent it from exerting its political, economic, and military influence in Europe.

The Truman Doctrine constituted a form of shock therapy: it was a last-ditch effort by the Administration to prod Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of the world leadership which one year earlier [1946], largely in response to public opinion, Washington officials had assumed by deciding to get tough with Russia.³⁰

To restrict the economic and political influence of the Soviet Union, the containment policy requested the immediate economic build-up and political stabilization. The decisive requisites for this were close ties between the U.S. and Europe on political, economic, and social issues. Containment policy thus became more than just a strategy to prevent any increase of Soviet power.³¹

relationship with the Soviet Union were to resist effectively the communists attempts. N.N., Memorandum, dated 5 January 1951, by Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of State, to President Harry S. Truman, available (online): <www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato29-2.htm> [March 2000] "At the conclusion of World War II, despite the major social, political, and economic dislocations which had occurred, it was hoped that the unity of purpose and of effort which the allies had shown in working together during the war would result in a peaceful era of reconstruction, and particularly that the Soviet Union would cooperate to this end with the democratic powers. This hope...was illusory because of the attitude and policy of the Soviet Union, which soon made it clear through its overt actions, and indirectly through the acts of various Communist Parties that it was bent upon a policy of ruthless expansion aimed at world domination."

³⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 351

³¹ N.N., *Die NATO - Eine Allianz im Wandel*, available (online): <www.bundeswehr.de/sicherheitspolitik/buendnisse/nato_50/wandel_11.htm> [March 2000]

In March 1946 the U.S. started to implement the containment policy, combining the three Western sectors of Germany and developing a common tri-national policy.³² The Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program - ERP) became effective in June 1947. This was the foundation for the economic and political recovery of all West European nations.

A common defense policy orientation of the transatlantic relationship was missing until 1948.³³ The withdrawal of the Western military contingents and the first Berlin Crisis in 1948/49 as part of the aggravation of the East-West-confrontation demonstrated the military vulnerability of the West. To turn the containment policy into a success, it became necessary to establish a transatlantic defense policy.

The Pact of Brussels signed by Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg in March 1948, was the first approach to find a common basis in military matters.³⁴ This Pact was the precondition for the integration of the U.S. in a European

³² Hans-Martin Ottmer, *Die Geschichte der Bundeswehr 1945 - 1992*, Verlag Mittler + Sohn, Berlin, 1993: The breakdown of a coordinated and common policy toward Germany became fact after the Summit of the Foreign Ministers of the former war coalition in March / April 1947.

³³ "While the Marshall Plan resulted in great strides toward economic stability in Western Europe, it was not in itself sufficient to create the necessary defensive strength or to allay the paralyzing fear psychosis which prevailed as a result of the complete defenselessness of the area." in: N.N., Memorandum, dated 5 January 1951, by Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of State, to President Harry S. Truman, available (online): <www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato29-3.htm> [March 2000]

³⁴ WEU Press Release, Brussels Treaty - Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense-, 17 March 1948, available (online): <www.weu.int/eng/index.html> [March 2000]

defense system. The American Senate decision on the Vandenberg Resolution, in June 1948, cleared the U.S. participation in a regional defense alliance beside the UN.³⁵

Senator McMahon stated:

We are doing now what we should have done 1919 and in 1936... If we realized then, as we do know, that war anywhere is war for us, and if we had notified the intended aggressor of the fact, the war would not have come. The third World War must be prevented, and I regard this alliance as one of the ways in which that objective can be attained.³⁶

The North Atlantic Treaty, short and to the point, covers in two pages, in fourteen articles, the essential political and legal bases of the Alliance, from political consultation to economic cooperation and collective defense.³⁷ But the crucial point was that the Treaty implemented an American security guarantee for Western Europe.³⁸

In the words of Senator Vandenberg:

The commitment is to take our share of the responsibility in maintaining and developing the capacity of the north Atlantic community to resist aggression in whatever way, including arms, if need be, that our own independent judgement from time to time determines to be necessary.

³⁵ Lord Ismay, NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954, Bosch - Utrecht, Netherlands, 1954, pp. 9-10 and N.N., The Vandenberg Resolution: The UN Charter and the Future Alliance, available (online): <www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nato/vandenberg.html> [March 2000]

³⁶ Brien Mc Mahon (Senator), quoted in: W.H. Lawrence, NATO Arms Aid Faces Senate Trouble, Though Pact Itself Hailed, New York Times, 19 March 1949

³⁷ NATO Press Release, The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, 1999, Brussels, 1998-1999, 2nd reprint, 1999, pp. 395-399

³⁸ Michael Ruehle, in: Erich Reiter (editor), Jahrbuch fuer internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999, Verlag Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, pp. 385, 392; and William S. White, Three Efforts to Soften NATO Text by Restrictions Decisively Beaten, New York Times, 22 July 1949: The Senate ratified on 21 July 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty by a vote of 82 to 13. The effort to add reservations to Art.5, in which the twelve signers declare that any aggression who moves against one of them moves against all, amended by Senator Arthur V. Watkins [Republican of Utah], became at least overwhelmed by a vote of 8 to 87.

This pact established no automatic right anyway to demand arms of us. It does establish a right to present a request and to have it considered by us in the light of this mutual responsibility and of our own honest estimate of the need and of our capacity to respond.³⁹

The security obligation in Article 5 still protects the U.S. from being forced into war against its will. Nonetheless, the commitment by the U.S. was revolutionary in its basic idea. The political tradition of isolationism and avoiding entangling Alliances in peacetime was overcome by the final formula, which included a strong commitment for collective defense. This has been the glue of common security.

The Treaty laid the basis for the organization, but detailed answers on the command network, the military strategy, and the force posture were postponed until further negotiations, due to the common understanding of what constituted the main threat for the Western security. Nonetheless, each member brought national concerns and interests to the Alliance as well.⁴⁰ Thus the different articles of the Treaty had to include clauses, that allowed leeway for future developments.

The need to create an overall strategy for NATO was agreed upon from the beginning. The strategic concept had to be based on the military plans, the political goals, and the economic priorities set out in the Treaty. A first draft was presented by the Standing Group (SG) in October 1949, highlighting the overall commitment of the nations, and defining the defense principles and objectives, the defense concept, and the

³⁹ U.S. Senator Vandenberg, quoted in: William S. White, *Three Efforts to Soften NATO Text by Restrictions Decisively Beaten*, New York Times, 22 July 1949,

⁴⁰ Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of the Alliance*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 5-8

military means.⁴¹ The main purpose was to coordinate the military and non-military national efforts more effectively. The deterrence of war was fixed as the ultimate goal and the military measures were grouped around the demand to ensure the ability to deliver the U.S. nuclear assets in a general war. The requirements for the nations were rather of a general kind. America's role consisted mainly in keeping the sea-lanes open, together with Great Britain, and to securing the capabilities of strategic bombardment.⁴²

Revised by the SG, the draft was submitted to the MC to agree upon and to transmit it to the DC for approval. In the revised draft the wording on the nuclear issue was strengthened and additional French remarks towards the European role in the Western Europe theatre and the special issue of the French colonies in Africa were implied.⁴³ Renamed DC 6 and finally, DC 6/1 the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area received ministerial approval on 6 January 1950. Preventing war and common, coordinated action in defense were the main purposes.⁴⁴

The Strategic Concept value was limited due to the overall goal of economic recovery and stability, and its only general commitment to principles, objectives, military and cooperative measures to implement the defense concept. To develop regional

⁴¹ MC 3 - The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area - 19 October 1949, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

⁴² Christian Greiner, *Von der massiven Vergeltung zur flexiblen Antwort*, in: *Truppenpraxis / Wehrausbildung*, April 1997, German MOD, Armed Forces Staff I 1, p. 255

⁴³ More about the national approaches: see MC 3/1, Enclosure C – Comments received by the Standing Group on the Overall Concept, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

⁴⁴ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, pp. 26-33; She characterizes the DC 6/1 strategy "...as immediate strategic nuclear response to a conventional attack, while conventional resistance was not credited with much effectiveness." p. 29

defense plans it was necessary to add more specific strategic guidance to the Concept. Therefore, the NAC formally approved MC 14, Strategic Guidance for the North Atlantic Regional Planning, which was to furnish a uniform and realistic basis for regional planning. A task list, a schedule for planning, and intelligence guidance set the stage for further regional planning. NATO's crucial purpose was, based on a threat assessment, to hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible and compensating for its numerical inferiority with technical superiority.

Later MC 14 and DC 6/1 were combined in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan, DC 13, adopted by the NAC on 1 April 1950. The DC 13 strategic aim was to destroy the will and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its satellites to wage war in the Western Eurasia region. In case of the outbreak of hostilities, operations were planned in four phases, culminating in major offensive operations in the form of strategic bombing. The DC 13's planning horizon was 1954, and it estimated the following force requirements: 90 infantry/armored divisions, about 7000 night fighter aircraft, about 1000 destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and about 100 submarines.⁴⁵

The DC 13 marked the end of the initial phase of formulating a common strategy. Key elements of the strategy were endorsed before the Korean War started.

⁴⁵ DC 13 - Medium Term Plan - 1 April 1950, Appendix "A", Requirements to meet 1954 Defense Plan, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

2. NATO on the Way to the Strategy of Massive Retaliation

On 25 June 1950, the Korean War started, with NATO member participation on behalf of the UN. The Korean War was the piece of evidence for the member-states' containment policy. Caused by member-states' engagement, NATO feared the spillover of war to Europe. NATO structures were estimated to be inadequate in this case. This was the origin for the build-up of an integrated military structure in NATO.

It took the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 to put the "O" in NATO – that is, to persuade the Allies to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime and to establish the presumption of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe. ...Pyongyang's attack was interpreted as evidence that the Communists...were prepared to resort to armed aggression... The attack against South Korea was perhaps but a prelude or distracting feint before a Communist attack against Western Europe.⁴⁶

In December 1950 Washington announced definite steps for NATO reinforcement. These included greater troop contingents on European territory, a combined force under an American supreme commander, and the establishment of a fully integrated civilian and military staff structure.⁴⁷ In January 1951 General Eisenhower became first supreme commander (SACEUR) and General Montgomery, standing for the European pillar of NATO, became his deputy. The Shape headquarters was established mid-1951, taking over the work of the preliminary five European Regional Planning

⁴⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp. 29-30

⁴⁷ Christian Greiner, *Von der massiven Vergeltung zur flexiblen Antwort*, in: *Truppenpraxis / Wehrausbildung*, April 1997, German MOD, Armed Forces Staff I 1, p. 255; and Lord Ismay, *NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954*, Bosch-Utrecht, Netherlands, 1954, pp. 68-81

Groups.⁴⁸ An International Staff enlarged NATO's organization. As a result, NATO became a potent organization with a clear military command structure.⁴⁹

With the integration of Greece and Turkey into NATO, on 18 February 1952, and the Lisbon Summit shortly after that, from 20 to 25 February 1952, the need to adapt the existing Strategic Concept became evident.⁵⁰ There were clear reasons to revise the DC 13 and the MC 14. The extension of SACEUR's right flank, the fact that the required conventional forces goals could not be reached until 1954, the impact of the Korean War, the changes in NATO structure, and the changes in the attitudes towards Germany's military participation led to the revision of the Concepts. The successor document, the MC 14/1 - Strategic Guidance - was approved by NAC during the Ministerial meeting in Paris, from 15 to 18 December 1952.⁵¹ Its overall goal was to deter the Soviets from operations by all means short of war, and to insure a successful defense with all available

⁴⁸ N.N., Shape HQs, The evolution of NATO and ACE 1951-1997, available (online): <www.shape.int/HISTORY/HIS_evol.htm> [March 2000]; and Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p. 55

⁴⁹ Martin Dahinden and Andreas Wenger, *Die NATO 50 Jahre nach ihrer Gruendung – eine Allianz im Wandel*, in: *Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, 1999, Zuerich, 15 March 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/pfp/ch/d990323a.htm> [March 2000] pp. 1-20

⁵⁰ Regarding to the Lisbon Summit agenda the question had to be answered how to reconcile massive force requirements of NATO's build up with the ability to contribute their appropriate share. In the end neither force goals, nor equitable burden sharing would be realized within the time span of the defense plan. In 1952-1953 the necessary financial and economic resources were not politically available. Later, with the end of the Korean War and the reliance on nuclear retaliation a justifying argument could be found for missing the conventional requirements. The Lisbon Force Goals showed also that without a military participation of Germany the objectives would be difficult to achieve. See also: Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, pp.58-59, and Lisbon forces goals: 1952: 50 divisions; 1953: 75 divisions; 1954: 96 divisions. in: Robert E. Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, pp. 87-88

⁵¹ NATO Press Release, Final Communiqué, NAC, Paris, 15-18 December 1952, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c521218a.htm> [March 2000]; and MC 14/1 - Strategic Guidance 9 December 1952 - in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

means. NATO's strategy was based on nuclear deterrence and an early use of nuclear weapons. This had considerable attractions for the Europeans, relying on the American nuclear sword without the need for maintaining national conventional forces at a level that was unattainable in view of the political and economical situation in Europe.⁵²

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in January 1953, the overall role of nuclear weapons, as a means of last resort, changed to one of being an integral part of American defense and, thus possibly a weapon of first resort.

During the National Security Council (NSC) meeting, 30 October 1953, the changing role became evident:

The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked.⁵³

In NSC-162/2, the basic National Security Policy analyzes the nature of Soviet threat, the implications for U.S. alliances and foreign commitments, the economic ramifications of defense, and the national security requirements.⁵⁴ Some of the factors, which tended to weaken the cohesion and slow down the necessary build up of strength, are summarized in the NSC 162/2:

⁵² J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 5

⁵³ N.N., NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, Washington, in: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol.II, p. 585

⁵⁴ N.N., NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, Washington, in: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol.II, pp. 577-595; and David Alan Rosenberg, *The Origins of Overkill, Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 1945-1960*, in: *International Security*, Spring 1983, vol.7, No.4, pp. 27-35

a)...The economic and military recovery...has given them [NATO Allies] a greater sense of independence from U.S. guidance and direction.

b)...A major weakness is the instability of the governments of certain NATO partners, such as Italy and France. The colonial issue in Asia and Africa ... not only weakened our European allies, but has left those areas in a state of ferment, which weakens the whole free world. ...Age-old issues such as divide France and Germany, or Italy and Yugoslavia, still impede creation of a solid basis of cooperation against the Soviet threat.

c)...Many Europeans fear that American policies, particular in the Far East, may involve Europe in general war, or will indefinitely prolong cold-war tensions.

d)...Many have serious doubts whether the defense requirements can be met without intolerable political and economic strains. Certain of our allies fear the rearmament of Germany...⁵⁵

The U.S. decided to strengthen British, French, and German cooperation in the field of defense to overcome the danger of subversion and disorder and to improve the means of collective defense.⁵⁶

Thus, Germany's entry into the Alliance and its re-armament became a crucial point for the realization of the political and military goals of the Alliance.⁵⁷ Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself expected from the re-armament the chance of obtaining full

⁵⁵ N.N., NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, Washington, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol.II, pp. 586-587

⁵⁶ J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, pp. 2-7

⁵⁷ Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford - England, 1998, pp. 54-56

sovereignty. His policy at the beginning of the 1950s was aimed at integrating West Germany into the structures of the Western community.⁵⁸

On 29 August 1950 Konrad Adenauer presented a memorandum to the High Commissioners, explaining German's contribution to security building up, as a first step of remilitarization.⁵⁹ When this proposal became public strong reactions worldwide and in Germany as well were aroused. In October 1950 the chancellor received a second memorandum of a military expert committee — the *Himmeroder Denkschrift* — recommending a German contingent integrated in a supranational force of Western Europe. This memorandum later provided the platform for the Accord Special, defining the German force contribution.⁶⁰

In October 1950 the French came up with an idea for a European Defense Community (EDC) on the basis of a plan of the French Prime-Minister René Pleven. It failed in 1954, caused by the French own resistance to subordinate its military units under a supranational European organization.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of the Alliance*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 53-55

⁵⁹ Hans Adolf Jakobsen, *Friedenssicherung durch Verteidigungsbereitschaft*, von Hase + Koehler Verlag, Mainz, 1990

⁶⁰ Werner Abelshauser, *Anfaenge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, Bd. IV, Editor: Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Verlag Oldenbourg, Muenchen, 1997, pp. 523

⁶¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement*, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 1999, pp. 59-64; and David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp. 30-31; and Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of the Alliance*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 55-57, 197-201 The French loss of Indochina had direct and indirect effects within the Alliance. The direct effect was the failure of the EDC and the subsequent remilitarization of Germany; indirectly it changed France role in NATO. The idea of self-reliance and independence in foreign and security policy issues became dominant in French policy. Thus, the EDC issue marked the starting point of disintegration of France from NATO.

Ultimately the compromise proposal of the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden found approval. West Germany's armed forces were supposed to be under SACEUR's operational control in times of war and under SACEUR's supervision and inspection in times of peace. West Germany accepted restrictions as to the structure and armament before the treaty could be signed, in October 1954 in Paris.⁶²

The Treaty of Paris fixed three core elements: First, the U.S. was willing to provide an extended nuclear deterrence for Western Europe and promised to increase its armed forces numerically in Europe. Second, for Germany the door was opened for a politically accepted and controlled re-armament. Third, the other Western member-states, including Great Britain, agreed to augment their ground forces on the European continent. With that, transatlantic cohesion was reinforced, the national efforts were coordinated, and a basis for a cooperative armed forces build-up program was established.

In February 1955 the U.S. Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) stated that the Soviet Union was capable of damaging U.S. territory and that this threat would drastically increase in the next 3-5 years, owing to new technological developments in the fields of means [hydrogen bomb] and delivery systems [long-range bombers].⁶³ The Panel emphasized the importance of maintaining the U.S. technological lead.

The nuclear arms race was heated up by several crises in 1956. The Suez crisis revealed the differences between the former colonial powers France, Great Britain and

⁶² Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, pp. 62-63

⁶³ David Alan Rosenberg, *The Origins of Overkill, Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 1945-1960*, in: *International Security*, vol.7, No.4, Spring 1983, pp.38-40

the U.S.. At the same time the Soviet's suppressed the Hungarian political efforts.⁶⁴ The limits of Western policy became obvious and made it necessary again to coordinate the goals and procedures of the Alliance's strategy. The strategy of all-or-nothing lost its credibility in the face of these threats. In the Directive to the NATO Military Authorities, from 13 December 1956, it was stated that the defense efforts had to be reviewed:

...a review of NATO defense planning is required in order to determine how, within the resources likely to be available, the defense effort of the alliance and of each individual member can best achieve the most effective pattern of force.⁶⁵

According to the directive, conventional forces, available for NATO operations, became more important. They had to fulfill certain missions, although the current strategy strongly relied on a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force. But beside deterrence, conventional forces were assigned for incidents like hostile local actions. They had to identify aggressions and had to deal with them in accordance with the concept of forward defense. The so-called shield forces had to gain time necessary to prepare the strategic counteroffensive. Moreover the directive offered guidance as to respond under specific circumstances to crises even outside the Alliance territory. Therefore, there were two main issues the Alliance had to find answers in order to

⁶⁴ Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, pp. 15-18, and Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of the Alliance, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 58-66

⁶⁵ C-M(56)138, - Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council -, 13 December 1956, Part II, paragraph 2, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

approve a new strategy: First, how to arrange the shield-sword forward defense, and second, how to take into account developments outside the NATO territory.

Basically nuclear weapons were still considered to be a low-cost alternative to conventional build-up.⁶⁶ This line of argumentation was supported by the availability of a sufficient U.S. atomic stockpile and strategic bombers. When the NATO Strategy MC 14/2 — Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area — was approved in 1957, MC 14/2 still anchored NATO's defense plans on a large-scale theater nuclear operation backed by a massive strategic nuclear blow against the Soviet homeland.⁶⁷ The Concept emphasized the national responsibility to build up adequate forces and it repeated the crucial role of economic stability. The risks of limited wars were evaluated and the response to such incidents was formulated, but a concept for a limited war was denied. However, the new strategy went on to recognize the need for non-nuclear response to a possible Soviet miscalculation of the situation. The tasks of the shield forces expanded. They had to protect the retaliatory capability, to maintain the territorial integrity, to protect industrial and military facilities, and to support adjacent commands. The integration of tactical nuclear weapons into the shield forces would improve their efficiency.

⁶⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp.48-60; and Kenneth B. Moss, *NATO's 50 Years*, available (online): <www.shape.nato.int/COMMUNITY_LIFE/1999/18-3-99/Nato's%2.htm> [March 2000] p. 2; and Robert A. Wampler, *NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons 1950-1957*, NHP(Nuclear History Program) Occasional Paper No.6, Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, 1990, pp. 11-26

⁶⁷ MC 14/2 - Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area - 21 February 1957, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

In order to ensure a capability to meet limited military situations in the NATO area which an aggressor might create...we must have flexibility in the NATO forces. ...to act promptly, to restore and maintain the security of the NATO area, without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.⁶⁸

The companion document to MC 14/2 was MC 48/2, which defined the military measures and explained the specific role of the retaliatory forces, on the one side, and the shield forces on the other side.⁶⁹

Under the new strategy, the role of NATO's limited ground forces in Europe was viewed as a means of compelling an aggressor to mobilize for an attack, thereby giving NATO advance warning, and if he did attack, holding him as far forward as possible until nuclear retaliation could take place. The strategy thus became widely known as the so-called "trip-wire"... But even by the time MC 14/2 was formally adopted, events were conspiring to undermine its credibility.⁷⁰

3. From Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response

The strategy of massive retaliation was developed at a time when U.S. territory still was not endangered by Soviet nuclear missiles. In October 1957 this situation drastically changed, when the Soviets successfully launched its first earth satellite

⁶⁸ MC 14/2 - Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area - 21 February 1957, paragraph 6 m (1-2), in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

⁶⁹ Robert A. Wampler, *NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons 1950-1957*, NHP Occasional Paper No.6, Center for International Security Studies, Maryland, 1990, pp. 26-40 and MC 48/2, - Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept - 23 May 1957, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

⁷⁰ J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 5

Sputnik.⁷¹ By late 1959 Eisenhower's concept of massive retaliation had shifted to a strategy of desperate resolve.

All we [U.S.] really have that is meaningful is a deterrent. ...The central question is whether or not we have the ability to destroy anyone who attacks us, because the biggest thing today [1959] is to provide a deterrent to war.⁷²

The possibility to reach the U.S. homeland with Soviet's nuclear forces, in fact, increased fears not only in the United States. European nations were not sure whether the U.S. would stop short of massive retaliation, if only parts of Europe were endangered.

There were strong reasons for changes in NATO strategy: First, the lack of credibility in the no-limited-war concept; second, the Soviet technological advance due to the Sputnik mission; third, the second Berlin Crisis 1958-1963; and fourth, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which nearly triggered a nuclear holocaust.⁷³

As with the massive retaliation strategy, the origins of the flexible response strategy lay in U.S. policy. With Robert McNamara and John F. Kennedy a phase of restructuring of the American security policy started, during which the role of nuclear

⁷¹ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp.60-68, "Sputnik was proclaimed another Pearl Harbor" p. 61; and Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, pp. 16-18

⁷² David Alan Rosenberg, *The Origins of Overkill, Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 1945-1960*, in: *International Security*, vol.7, No.4, Spring 1983, p. 62

⁷³ Holger H. Mey, *NATO-Strategie vor der Wende*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, vol.32, 1992, pp. 22-31

weapons was redefined and new decisions regarding the introduction of a new doctrine, flexible response, had to be taken within the Alliance.⁷⁴

This process started with the second Berlin Crisis, when the Soviets used Berlin as a lever to weaken Alliance cohesion and to find a more favorable solution to the status of Germany.⁷⁵ From the Soviet's view Berlin was a good opportunity for limited hostile activities to test NATO's credibility because the free access to Berlin was a core security issue of the Western Allies.⁷⁶

The strategy, MC 14/2, had no answer for this. It prescribed only a scenario in Western Europe in case of even limited hostile actions, which undoubtedly would have escalated into a general war.

To find an answer, the U.S., Great Britain, and France established an emergency-planning group for Berlin [LIVE OAK], in 1959, to develop synchronized plans in case of the escalation of the Berlin crisis.⁷⁷ At the beginning the secret planning took place out of NATO structures, but NATO strategy and forces were affected. Therefore, Alliance members strongly demanded participation and consultation in questions of

⁷⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp. 69-78; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, pp. 184-187

⁷⁵ Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy – Profile of Power*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993, pp. 175-184,

⁷⁶ "In Berlin the abstract possibility of war with the Soviet Union took concrete form. Kennedy declared that the city had become the greatest testing place of western courage and will. But if the West were tested there...courage and will...would not suffice to protect it. ...NATO's military position was extraordinarily weak." in: Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp. 94-95; and Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy – Profile of Power*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993

⁷⁷ Sean M. Maloney, *Notfallplanung fuer Berlin, Vorlaeufer der Flexible response 1958-1963*, in: *Militaergeschichte*, Heft 1, I. Quarter 1997, Verlag Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1997, pp. 3-15

Berlin's contingency [BERCONS] planning. But the military and political demands, as well as the national approaches towards the use of nuclear weapons and the deployment and strength of preplanned forces differed widely. As a result, the elaboration of the critical points indirectly set the stage for changes in NATO's strategy. A direct effect of this planning was the full implementation of forward strategy — the deployment of the allied forces next to the inner-German border.⁷⁸

On the NATO level the Kennedy-administration began again to revise NATO's strategy. At the ministerial meeting of the NAC, in Athens, 5 May 1962, McNamara advocated a continuous examination of the balance between conventional and nuclear forces.⁷⁹ With reference to the Berlin Crisis and more likely contingencies for the future, McNamara explained his idea of:

...enabling the Alliance to engage in a controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrence should fail. ...Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years. The unprecedented destructiveness...has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. ...The question at issue now is the point at which NATO, not the Soviets, would wish to escalate a non-nuclear conflict. ...it simply is not credible that NATO, or anyone else, would respond to a given small step – the first slice of salami – with immediate use of nuclear weapons.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Sean M. Maloney, Notfallplanung fuer Berlin, Vorlaeufer der Flexible response 1958-1963, in: Militaergeschichte, Heft 1, I. Quarter 1997, Verlag Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1997, p. 13

⁷⁹ NATO Press Release, Final Communiqué, Athens 4-6 May 1962, paragraph 9, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c620504a.htm> [March 2000]

⁸⁰ McNamara, Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 5 May 1962, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol.VIII, pp. 275-283

Subsequently America's arguments for a change of strategy followed two lines. First, the vulnerability of the own [U.S.] systems should be reduced by a flexible response, and second, the risk of unavoidable global destruction by means of nuclear weapons had to be minimized.⁸¹ Nuclear weapons should become the weapon of last resort.

The recommendations to change the existing massive retaliation strategy aroused the Allies criticism — just as Dulles's massive retaliation statement had eight years earlier — not least because it included a sharp attack on the independent nuclear capabilities of France and Great Britain and it constituted a clear move away from the concept of massive retaliation.⁸²

The French, whose attempts to create an independent nuclear force were directly attacked by the American Secretary of Defense, reacted with open hostility. ...the French government perceived the McNamara strategy as another proof that the United States was about to withdraw from its alliance commitment.⁸³

The Europeans were convinced that the Soviet Union could only be hindered from waging a war if a threat posed by the Soviet Union was unmistakably answered by the application of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Western partners rejected the expected high costs of necessary conventional armaments.

⁸¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement*, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 1999, pp. 99-111 and Gordon A. Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, chapter XV Crisis Management, pp. 213-216

⁸² J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, pp. 7-10; and Holger H. Mey, *NATO-Strategie vor der Wende*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, vol.32, 1992, p. 25

The main point of criticism was the perception that deterrence was no longer the only aim of NATO. The statement of McNamara that the Alliance should not automatically react to a conventional Soviet attack with nuclear weapons stood in contrast to Europe's understanding of stability and deterrence. This was a crucial issue for West Germany as well, since, according to the Paris Agreements of 1954, it had renounced possession of own nuclear weapons, and it had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1967. A NATO strategy that would have called for the employment of nuclear weapons only as a countermeasure in the event of a nuclear attack would have made West Germany vulnerable to conventional attacks in an intolerable way. West Germany agreed to a flexible response only when the Americans managed to convince them of their willingness to defend Germany's territory with both conventional and nuclear means.

German strategic thinking in the nuclear age was driven by two fundamental principles: there had to be a commitment to equal security within the alliance and the use of nuclear weapons to defend Germany, and Germany ought not to become a nuclear battlefield.⁸⁴

The German demand for consultation with regard to nuclear planning was taken up in mid-1965 and became transferred in organizational terms with the foundation of the

⁸³ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 185

⁸⁴ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, p. 146

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1967.⁸⁵ With this agreement on the nuclear issue the obstacles that had brought about standstills in other fields were overcome.

Nevertheless it took four more years after the Athens Summit to formulate a new strategic concept. The effects of the Kennedy assassination in November 1963 and France's strong reservations can explain this stagnation to processing the new ideas.⁸⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's successor, was much more concerned with the events in Southeast Asia and De Gaulle was very suspicious of the U.S. commitment to Europe. Basically De Gaulle's announcements on 9 September 1965 and 10 March 1966 — to remove France from the integrated military structure of NATO — provided the Alliance with the leeway to develop two new NATO documents. The MC 14/3, Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, was finalized on 16 January 1968, and MC 48/3, Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area, was adopted on 4 December 1969.⁸⁷

The MC 14/3 was a product of coalition planning and management between the administrations and NATO Headquarters. Political and military assumptions and

⁸⁵ Christian Greiner, *Von der massiven Vergeltung zur flexiblen Antwort*, in: *Truppenpraxis / Wehrausbildung*, April 1997, German MOD, Armed Forces Staff I 1, p. 260; and Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, pp. 129-131

⁸⁶ "But McNamara had a difficult struggle to convince not only the Allies but also the NATO military authorities, particularly SACEUR, General Lemnitzer, who argued for the retention of MC 14/2. McNamara's eventual victory was an important turning point in asserting political control over the military authorities." in: J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 9

⁸⁷ MC 14/3 - Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area 16 January 1968 - and MC 48/3 - Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area - 8 December 1969, in: Gregory W. Pedlow, *The Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1969*, available (online): <www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm> [March 2000]

demands had to be interwoven. The readiness of all nations to compromise was therefore the basic requirement for a successful conclusion of the negotiations.

Like its predecessor documents, MC 14/3 dealt in detail with the Soviet threat, but recognized much more outside-Europe aspects as important issues and provided answers for diverse sorts of aggressions and threats. Common defense, effective forces, flexibility, and no automatism in action and reaction had been the key issues of this strategy. The dominant goal was to maintain a nuclear deterrent with secure retaliatory capabilities on a high level of readiness. The MC 14/3 identified three types of response: First, seeking to defeat the enemy on the same level; second, escalating deliberately by expanding scope and intensity of combat; and third, responding according to the old concept of a general nuclear war.⁸⁸

The new concept was developed parallel to the Harmel Report [bearing the official title: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance"].⁸⁹ The Harmel Report, which was accepted at the NAC meetings on 12 November 1967, added the issue of détente to the major purposes of NATO.

⁸⁸ "Such a policy clearly entailed risk; there was widespread agreement that if deterrence failed, deliberate escalation would be extremely difficult to control once it reached the nuclear level. But both the American and the European Allies were prepared to accept this, although for essentially contradictory reasons: the Europeans because the threat to use TNW (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) represented the best way of "coupling" the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe, and the Americans because it offered the best hope of preventing a major land battle in Europe from escalating to an all-out strategic exchange." in: J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 10

⁸⁹ Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution - A Crisis of Credibility 1966-1967*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 320-386 and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement*, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 1999, p. 115

In the 1967 Harmel Report, the two main purposes of the Atlantic Alliance were recalled in a classic formulation. The first purpose was (and remains) to maintain sufficient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to defend the Allies in the event of aggression, and to assure the balance of force, thereby creating a climate of stability, security, and confidence. Fulfillment of the first purpose would create a basis for the second: to pursue the search of progress toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.⁹⁰

The broad aim of the Harmel Report was to enter into a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union in order to reduce tensions between East and West without necessarily weakening the defense capability of the Alliance.

The MC 14/3 thus was part of a comprehensive strategy to overcome the rigid structures of the Cold War and to give NATO an expanded role. It was a question of rendering the military and diplomatic strategies more flexible and of watering down the suicide-or-surrender alternative.⁹¹ Both efforts thus served the same purpose.

Harmel aspired to narrow the political divide between the two blocs, to reduce Soviet paranoia, to temper the Warsaw Pact's aggressive instincts, and to lessen the danger of war breaking out over unresolved disputes. MC 14/3 endeavored to render war less likely by shoring up NATO's deterrent, and to make war more manageable and less prone to runaway escalation if it did occur. The effect was to be a two-fold contribution to NATO's security: better relations with the adversary and a more stable military balance of power.⁹²

⁹⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp. 35-36

⁹¹ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium*, Brassey's Inc., Herndon VA, 1997, Brassey's Inc., p. 8

⁹² Richard Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p. 185

With the Harmel Report and the MC 14/3 solidarity among the Allies and especially the transatlantic link could be strengthened and reservations on both sides of the Atlantic about the consequences of forward defense and flexible response could be overcome.

For decades to come MC 14/3 was to remain the basis of NATO strategy. NATO's strategy had changed its character from a military strategy to a political compromise, taking into consideration the member-states' concerns. It corresponded to American concerns with the conventional defense capability of NATO and the preference for a symmetrical defense, but it also implied strong concessions to the Western allies, above all in terms of nuclear deterrence. It was a strategy that was acknowledged by all. The real value of flexible response was that it served as the basis for Alliance consent. Furthermore it was also difficult to find any practical alternative to flexible response in view of the political constraints of the Alliance.

Nonetheless the strategy was in no way perfect. It depended for its effect on creating uncertainty in a potential adversary, and consequently could never provide a totally certain guarantee to the Alliance.⁹³ Rising disputes during the 1970s and 1980s with the anti-nuclear groups and the peace movement, on the one side, and the governments, on the other side, were the negative result of this.

⁹³ Holger H. Mey, *NATO-Strategie vor der Wende*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Bd. 32, 1992, pp. 29-31

4. The Implementation and Failure of the Policy of Détente

In retrospect, it appears remarkable that all the U.S.-Soviet Union confrontations over Berlin, Korea, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, and South Asia could be regulated without ending in a general war. The reason behind that has been the common fear of a general war.⁹⁴ The superpowers had learned some fundamental rules of prudence in managing their rivalry. Arms control measures and crisis avoidance strategies were established to prevent unforeseen developments in military technology and sudden changes in the force posture, which could destabilize the equilibrium of the Cold War status quo.⁹⁵

Willy Brandt, German Chancellor at that time, initiated a policy aimed at closer relations with the Eastern Europe states, which led in 1970-1971 to treaties between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland and an accommodation with the East German regime [*Ostpolitik*]. Brandt's policy created an atmosphere that encouraged détente and removed a barrier that had inhibited Soviet-American discussions of the division of

⁹⁴ "Khrushchev neatly summed up the Cold War's nuclear paradox: each side devoted huge resources to developing weapons it hoped never to use. Their strategic value lay in deterring the other side. The superpowers would refrain from attacking each other because of the certainty of mutual assured destruction, better known by its apt acronym, MAD. This theory, which underpinned the Cold War, epitomized the craziness of the nuclear balance of power: to start a war would mean almost certain self-destruction." in: Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, p. 231

⁹⁵ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp. 191-208; and Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, pp. 19-22

Europe. The fruition of this concept was the Helsinki agreement, signed at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁹⁶

From the Kennedy to the Carter administrations U.S. policy twined around the idea of building up a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S. accepted the Soviet Union as a superpower in general and legitimized the division of Europe in a formal diplomatic manner. It entered into a variety of formal agreements with the Soviet Union in the economic and commercial sphere to use economic cooperation to overcome political tensions, and set norms and rules for the competition between the superpowers.⁹⁷

Détente policy placed great emphasis on working out [arms control treaties in 1972 and 1973] agreements to reduce the danger of a new world war. Nonetheless the positive effects, on the one side, were counteracted by the Soviet's worldwide activities, on the other side. The Soviet's policy to support liberation movements in the Third World, its role in the Arab-Israel War in October 1973, and its support and assistance to Cuban military intervention in Angola in 1975 put a strain on détente.

The overall minimal success of détente led to a decline of American public support. When the Soviet Union did not stop to support regimes in Asia and Africa, favorable to them, why should the West reward this policy by appeasement policy? Additionally, the threat of a third world war, the reason for détente, became less

⁹⁶ Gordon A. Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp.137-138; and Helsinki Final Act, CSCE, 1 August 1975, available (online): <www.osce.org/indexe-da.htm> [March 2000]

⁹⁷ Gordon A. Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 136-146

intelligible to the public, which did not see the danger as being so imminent. The Cold War was easier to legitimize than détente. The main criticisms against détente were:

...(1) that linkage had not produced the results the administration had promised; (2) that the global military balance had been allowed to shift in favor of the Soviet Union; (3) that excessive concentration on relations with Russia and China had led to the neglect or distortion of other pressing issues; and (4) that no attempt had been made to maintain the foundation of morale principle upon which United States foreign policy had to rest if it was to command support at home and respect abroad.⁹⁸

The deployment of the SS 20 [Intermediate-Range Missile] by the Soviet Union in 1977 marked a new chapter in relations between East and West.⁹⁹ Most alarming was that, in pursuing détente with the U.S., the Soviet Union was developing means to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe. There was the danger that the strategic deterrence practiced by the U.S. could be de-coupled from the defense of Western Europe. Therefore, Helmut Schmidt, James Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing and Jimmy Carter agreed upon a common dual-track position. In December 1979 the NAC adopted a resolution concerning the dual-track position and the deployment of 572 Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe.¹⁰⁰ Disarmament negotiations and the deployment of systems were to be carried out simultaneously. The dual-track approach was on the one hand a

⁹⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp. 309-310

⁹⁹ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, pp. 316-319

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 190; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, pp. 134-140

strong political signal to the Soviet Union. On the other hand it caused a rising peace movement in Europe.

When Carter handed over office to his successor, Ronald Reagan, in January 1981, détente had not brought the desired success. During the Carter-administration the Soviet Union continued its military build up and America came close — in the opinion of the public — to military inferiority.¹⁰¹

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 lead to a distinct position of the Americans and NATO members against this politic.

5. The Break Down of Communism and the End of the Cold War

The Alliance fully matured in the 1980s. It was a decade of strategic resurgence followed by the end of the Cold War. President Reagan mounted a military build up by increasing defense spending, modernizing strategic forces, and launching the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for ballistic missile defense.¹⁰²

President Reagan promised to strengthen U.S. military power, to restore containment, deterrence, and respect for American power.¹⁰³ He started a new phase of

¹⁰¹ Gordon A. Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 145-146

¹⁰² Richard L. Kugler, *NATO Chronicle: The Cold War Years*, 1999, p. 12

¹⁰³ Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, Vintage Books, New York, 1987, pp. 27-42, 47-66

rearmament, increasing the defense budget by \$ 32.6 billion within two years.¹⁰⁴ Return to dominance was the credo of Reagan's policy.¹⁰⁵

In Europe this position was not undisputed. From the European perspective Reagan's nuclear policies, maritime doctrines, and unilateralism did not go down well.¹⁰⁶ Especially in Germany President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative aroused strong public protest.

A fundamental change in the East-West relation was closely linked to Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. Gorbachev stimulated the Soviet Union's effort to move forward into a system of socialism with more democracy and social consciousness. He wanted to stop the arms race, and consequently proposed to freeze nuclear arsenals and to stop further developments of missiles. Therefore, Gorbachev's election marked a new beginning in the East-West relationship.¹⁰⁷ The Soviet Union started a withdrawal from Afghanistan, cooperated in bringing a settlement for Namibia, and supported a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. In addition to his de-geopolitization efforts in Soviet foreign policy, he started a campaign to de-ideologize international affairs.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, p. 334

¹⁰⁵ Lawrence Friedman, *The Price of Peace*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1986, p. 142

¹⁰⁶ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, 1997, p. 22-22; and Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, Vintage Books, New York, 1987, pp. 138-141

¹⁰⁷ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, p. 356

¹⁰⁸ Gordon A Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp.269-272

At the United Nations in December 1988 Gorbachev announced his commitment to freedom of choice for all nations, which sent a signal to the Central European states. He promised huge military force withdrawals. In 1989 the decline of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union started.¹⁰⁹

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and then of the Soviet Empire, and with the end of the Cold War voices were heard demanding the dissolution of the Alliance.¹¹⁰ But, despite the public hopes, the world did not become safer. Due to the new growing challenges and risks that are closely connected with the breakup of the Soviet Empire, the dissolution of NATO was not considered reasonable. As Hungarian Prime Minister Jozef Antall said in October 1991:

The point is NATO should assume responsibility for the security of the region lying between its borders and the Soviet border. The legal and organizational issues are of secondary importance.¹¹¹

Stability and security within and for Europe are still valid values and the basic necessity of a transatlantic security dimension has not changed since the end of the Cold War.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, pp. 366-375

¹¹⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 47

¹¹¹ Jozsef Antall, quoted in Celestine Bohlen, *Tensions in Other Countries Raise Concerns in Hungary*, New York Times, 13 October 1991, p. 6

¹¹² Michael Ruehle, in: Erich Reiter (editor), *Jahrbuch fuer internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999*, Verlag Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, 1999, p. 393

We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.¹¹³

C. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SINCE 1989 – NEW RISKS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

The notion of security has changed since the Cold War ended. Security has become much broader in scope and comprises more than the territorial integrity of a nation, or an Alliance. Security policy's main goal is to keep common and accepted norms and values, like the rule of law, freedom, and liberty, undamaged¹¹⁴.

Liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and social and economic welfare are only achievable when three factors are prominent: stability, rationality, and trust (cooperative relationship). Stability helps to put down all attempts to change the status quo through military and other threatening means. Rationality leads to clear and sober reflection on data and facts, and trust and cooperation can be best developed on the basis of good neighborhood. Logically everything that threatens stability, rationality, and trust constitutes risks and challenges for the Alliance.

Who are the actors shaping future security developments?

¹¹³ North Atlantic Council, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 6 July 1990, paragraph 1, available (online): <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/90070600.html> [March 2000]

¹¹⁴ Joerk-Eckart Reschke, Admiral (retired), Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, ueberarbeitete Fassung des Mittler-Briefes, I. Quarter 1999, available (online): <www.baks.com/453rosbp3.html> [March 2000]

The dominant actors are the market democracies. Their ideology has become the global model... The United States remained the leader... States in transition constitutes a second group ... The most important of these transition states are China, Russia, and India. ...The third category of states consists of...rogues or rejectionist states: notably Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Sudan, Cuba, and now Serbia. A fourth category includes the failing states: Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Algeria, Somalia, and Haiti... Finally non-state actors have begun to take on many state characteristics. Some support the market democracies, such as global companies; some prey on them, like international crime syndicates; and some seek to bring market democracies down, for example terrorist organizations.¹¹⁵

Due to these actors and their relations the Alliance will be facing a wide array of future challenges and risks.¹¹⁶ The fact is that more diverse, multifaceted, and often low-level intensity conflicts and tensions involving multiple agencies have replaced the direct military confrontations of the Cold War. NATO members agree that no one nation can truly address single-handedly these diverse and transnational dangers. Crises and conflicts today can break out with little or no notice and demand for sustained multilateral efforts and strategies.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Hans Binnendijk and Alan Henrikson, Back to Bipolarity?, in: Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No.161, May 1999, available (online): <www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum161.html> [March 2000] p. 4

¹¹⁶ "Four key risks and uncertainties facing NATO: ...the first is the residual risk emanating from Russia as it struggles with its enormous societal, ideological, and economic transformation. ...The second risk is that posed by the various unresolved disputes within Europe - ethnic, religious, and territorial - with the Balkans as the most visible example. ...the third risk to NATO is the instability that exists along the periphery of Europe, ranging from Morocco to the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. Additionally we see there the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, such as missiles. ...my fourth key risk, the so-called new risks, new reasons for conflict, due to mass migrations or scarcity of water to new forms of conflicts. ...such as attacks on our societies by international criminals..." in: Klaus Naumann, General (retired), former chairman NATO-MC, XVth International Workshop in Vienna, 20 June 1998, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980620.htm> [March 2000]

¹¹⁷ Klaus Naumann, General (retired), Rolle und Aufgaben der NATO in der Zukunft, in: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 22 March 1999, Bonn, available (online): <www.baks.com/463_naumann.html> [March 2000]; and Hartmut Bagger, General (retired), former CHOD Bundeswehr,

In comparison with the Cold-War situation there is a strategic breathing space now. The situation seems to be under control, but this can change very fast. NATO has to be prepared for changes and has to find a consensus on this.

Since 1989 NATO has had to assess following security problems:

First, Russia's role has to be defined. Russia still is a dominant nuclear power. It remains a wild card for the future security of NATO nations. Russia's transformation process is ongoing, and not without certain shortcomings and interruptions. The political, economic and social developments are beyond the expected timelines, and corruption, oligarchic structures, hegemonic claims, and a demoralized and angry population complicate the democratization process and the economic prosperity. The change of president might be more a sign of continuity, but the situation in Kosovo in 1999 has shown that tensions between Russia, on one side, and the other European nations and the U.S., on the other side, can rise immediately. Russia's fear of becoming a less important political player and to lose control over the developments in Europe can force it to intensify its bilateral relations, for example with China and the Iran.¹¹⁸ Russia wants to extend its relation with China and Iran on the military and military-technical basis; this may cover the cooperation on nuclear matters too. This less Western-orientated policy can change the strategic situation drastically.

Politik und Sicherheit Europas zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends, February 1999, published in: Gesellschaft für Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitik, available (online): <www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/ES2-99baggerSichEuropa.htm> [March 2000]

¹¹⁸ Jens Hartmann, Starke Worte gegen Fischer in der Moskauer Presse - Anlaßlich der Reise des deutschen Außenministers verschärft sich in Russland die antiwestliche Stimmungsmache, in: Die Welt, 21 January 2000, available (online): <www.welt.de/daten/2000/01/21/0121au148130.htm> [March 2000]

Second, Russia's role is closely connected with the development of the states that emerged from the former Soviet Union in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. There remain potential sources of instability and uncertainty. These nations have reached different levels on their way to reform and democracy, but progress is likely to be slow and can be easily encountered by ethnic, religious, and social tensions, as well as by economically undesirable developments and political coups. NATO has to walk a fine line between Russia and the new states. Moreover the situation in the Balkans has created an insecure environment and will bind at least huge military contingents and budgetary efforts.

Third, it is not only the Eastern part of Europe, which substantially leads to tensions. To Europe's south, the Middle East and the Mediterranean Area provide instabilities and uncertainties. The Middle East Peace Process holds hope for a more controllable and balancing situation, but there are still fundamental, unsettled differences to be overcome between Israel and its neighbors. Regimes like Libya, Iran, or Iraq can easily endanger the rising stability in this region. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea, especially for the U.S., makes the southern countries valuable for NATO. Aggravating factors are that conflicts in this region could have spillover effects for the European nations, and that long-range missiles in the hands of rogue states in this area can pose direct threats to European states.

Fourth, the threats of terrorism, whether state-supported or organized by radical groups, and the rising problem of proliferation concerns NATO as well will lead to destabilization. The technological developments on the military field and the factors,

linked to the matter of globalization can have both positive and negative effects on societies. They can make NATO nations vulnerable to terrorist acts at home and worldwide. The possibilities in terms of vulnerable targets are virtually unlimited. These asymmetric threats will demand for a new strategy, because the superiority in traditional weapon technology will not solve these issues.

Fifth, poverty, famine, demographic developments, environmental issues such as degradation of agricultural land, pollution, depletion of fish stocks, and deforestation, and the competition for natural resources like oil, gas, and water can intensify tensions and can cause mass migration with destabilizing effects for the whole region.

Sixth, NATO member nations are affected by the developments in Asia. It is not only the dependence on the financial market situation in Asia, but the situation on the Korean peninsula, the tensions between India and Pakistan, unleashing a dangerous nuclear arms race, and the future role of China and Japan. Despite NATO's Euro-Atlantic orientation, changes outside this area influence the situation within the defined arc of security and stability.

Seventh, the changing relationship between the U.S. and the European member countries can lead to tensions. The technological gap on one side and the process of European integration on the other side can have negative effects on the cohesion of the Alliance. Deepening and enlarging NATO at the same time can also influence the common approach towards security issues. Even economic issues will create tensions among NATO nations, but at least these tensions will be manageable, as seen in the past.

The most challenging factor, however, is the unpredictability of what kind of world will emerge in the next decades.

NATO has to prepare for these uncertain and often counter-moving dynamics.¹¹⁹ The joint and combined operations in Bosnia and the Kosovo have demonstrated clearly that all NATO countries must be able to deploy military contingents beyond national borders in order to be effective against destabilizing influences.

¹¹⁹ William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy, San Francisco, 26 February 1999, available (online): <worldnews.about.com/medianews/worldnews/blforpol.htm?once&> [March 2000]; and "Defining these risks against a constantly changing political background ... was one of the most difficult tasks facing the SRG. The eventual outcome was a carefully balanced assessment of the risks which might arise as a result of instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe - with particular reference to the special case of the Soviet Union - and on the Southern periphery of the Alliance" in: Michael Legge, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy and Chairman of the Strategic Review Group (SRG), The Making of NATO's New Strategy, December 1991, p. 4, available (online): <hq.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9106-2.htm> [March 2000]

III. NATO – IN TRANSITION, 1990 TO 1999

A. THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF 1991

The events in 1989-91 that marked the end of the Cold War...obliged the Allies to redefine NATO's purposes and to endow it with new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and dialogue with adversaries. ...the two most significant new roles are clearly cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in new institutions such as Partnership for Peace, and crisis management and peace operations beyond the territory of NATO allies.¹²⁰

The NAC agreed upon the necessity of preparing a new military strategy only one month after the London NATO Summit in July 1990. The Strategy Review Group prepared a first outline of the review in August 1990, and the first draft circulated that October. However, it took sixteen months to develop the new strategic review.

The final version was preceded by twelve drafts, a reflection of the problems of reaching a consensus — and thus unanimous vote — on such a wide-ranging review.¹²¹

Beside the bureaucratic hurdles, the work on the draft was made even more difficult by the fact that the security situation in Europe was difficult to predict.

¹²⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 72

¹²¹ Compromises had to be found on the European security Identity (ESDI), the special relationship with Russia, the out-of-area operations in general, the differentiation in the relationship with Central European countries, the future role of NATO and the core security functions, the relationship between political cooperation and dialogue and the necessity of collective defense, and finally the role of the nuclear weapons: in: Michael Legge, *The Making of NATO's New Strategy*, NATO web-edition, No.6, vol.39, December 1991, pp. 9-14, available (online): <hq.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9106-2.htm> [March 2000]

The early 1990s were a time of confusion, disorientation, hope and fear. ...First, German unification came sooner than expected. ...Second, it soon became clear that in response to the changes in the security situation, countries wanted to quickly reduce their defense efforts and, if possible, cash in with a peace dividend. ...Third, relations with the Warsaw Pact countries improved apace. ...Fourth, the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Union (EU) began.... Fifth, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded sooner than expected. ...Sixth, there were negative developments, which increased doubts about the future.¹²²

The Concept was approved at the Rome Summit in November 1991 and presented to the public.¹²³ The publication of this document was quite different from the handling of the former strategy document, the MC14/3. The concept was the first strategy, focused on stability as a positive objective without relating to an enemy. Together with the MC400 approved by the Military Committee four weeks later, this strategic concept replaced the MC 14/3.¹²⁴

Both documents stand for the fundamental changes in NATO's policy. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept had to fit the fundamentally changed environment. It had to cover the diverse national views on security, on NATO's future tasks, on force requirements and on policy toward new partners. Thus, the public character of the document and the fundamental changes in attitude constitute the real revolutionary development of NATO.

¹²² Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the Millennium*, Brassey's Inc., Herndon VA, 1997, pp. 20-21

¹²³ Anthony Cragg, *A new Strategic Concept for a new era*, NATO-online library, web-edition vol.47, No.2, Summer 1999, pp. 19-22, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-04.htm> [March 2000] and Kori N. Schake, *NATO Chronicle: New World Disorder*, in: *Joint Force Quarterly*, The Washington Summit, Special Edition, April 1999, pp. 18-24

¹²⁴ NATO Press Release, Press Communiqué S-1 (91) 85, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, NAC meeting, Rome, 7-8 November 1991

The Concept contained the following core elements of the new strategic thinking:¹²⁵

1. Extended notion of security: Realizing that security and stability are not exclusively military categories but a mix of interrelating political, economic, social, cultural, ecological, as well as military factors was nothing new, but it became the foundation for the answers on the new risks and uncertainties.

2. New role of Europe: It emphasized the role and responsibility of the European countries and supported the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the Western European Union.

3. Stability through cooperation: The element of cooperation was added to the concept of the Harmel Report. Conflict prevention should no longer be primarily based on deterrence but on co-operative structures and deterrence. Cooperative structures should increasingly create reliability and stability.

4. New tasks: Crisis management should play a more important role.

5. Arms control and defense policy: The Concept also stated that predictability and mutual trust became important elements of strategic thinking.

6. Spectrum of tasks: As compared to the former focus on deterrence and defense, the military was now granted a broader spectrum of tasks subdivided into peace, crisis and war. In a protected peace the military was to contribute to cooperation, transparency and trust through intensive military contacts with former enemies. In times of crisis, it

¹²⁵ Markus Meckel, NATO on the Threshold of the 21st Century a New Strategy for Peace, Security and Stability, Draft General Report Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, 20 October 1999, available (online): <www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1999/as275pc-e.html> [March 2000]

had to keep available flexible armed forces and procedures for graduated contributions to crisis control.

7. Force requirements: The future requirements for NATO armed forces reflected on the new task spectrum. The changed requirements were characterized by reduced overall strengths and levels of readiness; by regional differentiation abandoning the former linear defense posture in the Central Region; by increased flexibility and mobility, build-up capability and the capability to reinforce any region in the Alliance; and increasing importance of multinational armed forces.

8. Nuclear policy: Finally, in terms of nuclear deterrence, the Concept confirmed what the drastic reduction of the NATO arsenal had already signaled. The circumstances under which the Alliance would have to consider the use of nuclear weapons had receded into the far distance. Thus, the political, war-preventing, stabilizing function of the nuclear weapons of the Alliance was stressed even more clearly than in the past. Additionally the Concept referred specifically to the need for missile defense, for measures against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and for precautionary measures against chemical weapons.

The most fundamental change was in fact the re-definition of NATO's original *raison d'être* as set out in the NATO Treaty. NATO was able to go beyond its strict focus on the military aspect, which had been a necessity of the Cold War.

B. NATO'S TRANSFORMATION IN A CHANGED LANDSCAPE

In the period of almost continual change since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has not stood still. NATO has added three new mission arrows, namely, crisis prevention / crisis management, stability projection, and counter proliferation, to its collective-defense quiver. It has also undergone significant transformations, especially with respect to its military capabilities...¹²⁶

Even though the Soviet Union collapsed [December 1991] one month after the document was approved, the Alliance's New Strategic Concept proved to be viable in the years after 1991. Nevertheless the security environment changed so drastically and at such a speed that there arose evident reasons to update the Concept sooner than one could have predicted in November 1991. This fact was due to external changes as well as to lessons learned and the further development of allied policy.¹²⁷

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia acted as a strong catalyst. In the case of Bosnia NATO's military and political role in the area of crisis management, aimed at preventing crisis from spreading all over the region, was extended, and this broadened the meaning and content of peacekeeping.¹²⁸

The decades-long controversial debate over whether NATO should also engage in out-of-area military operations — i.e., outside the area in which the member countries

¹²⁶ General Klaus Naumann, NATO - A Military Perspective, NATO Speech, XVth. Int. NATO Workshop, 20 June 1998, Vienna, available (online): <www.vm.ee/nato/docu/speech/1998/s980620a.htm> [March 2000]

¹²⁷ Günter Hoefler, NATO neu - eine Allianz im Wandel, Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ), March 1998, pp. 247-260 Internal Adaptation: subsumes the new command structure, the CJTF-Concept, and the ESDI-initiative.

¹²⁸ Rudolf Scharping, Europa und Amerika - gemeinsam auf dem Weg in das 21. Jahrhundert, Gesellschaft für Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitik, July 1999, available (online): <www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/ES99-07ScharpingEuropaAmerika.htm> [March 2000]

had agreed to assist one another in line with Article 6 of the Washington Treaty — was settled for the moment by the normative power of facts. During the 1994 summit in Brussels the Heads of State and Government explicitly confirmed a proposal made by the NATO foreign ministers in 1992 to make NATO assets and capabilities available for peacekeeping missions under the patronage of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

It became evident that, in line with the broader understanding of security, crisis management could no longer be defined only in military terms. However, crisis management must have a military backbone right from the start to ensure validity and credibility. The experience with crisis management revealed that the common distinction between peace, crisis, and war no longer fit the new disorder and NATO's new roles. New requirements of force capabilities became evident. But the idea of the Peace dividend led at the same time to cuts in force sizes, to lowered levels of readiness, to defense budget cuts, and to the elimination of conscription in several member countries.

Another innovative element was the deliberate extension of the co-operative approach, which had already been initiated in the concept of Integration and Co-operation as part of the Concept and which comprised the following elements:¹²⁹

1. NATO enlargement, starting with three Central and Eastern European countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and the open-door policy;

¹²⁹ Günter Hoefler, NATO neu – eine Allianz im Wandel, External Adaptation: subsumes the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine partnership, the EAPR, the enhPfP-program, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the NATO-enlargement issue; and David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp.74-75; and N.N., NATO - und EU - Mitgliedschaften - Kongruenz oder differenzierte Gestaltung?, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 1998, available (online): <www.baks.com/4198B.html> [March 2000]

2. The Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) program, which also enabled concrete co-operation with PfP-nations on operations in the former Yugoslavia as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC – replacing the NACC in May 1997] as its control element and as a forum for consultation of NATO members and Partners;¹³⁰

3. Strategic cooperation with Russia in the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council on the basis of the NATO-Russian Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security of May 1997;¹³¹

4. The special relationship with the Ukraine as part of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean dialogues with individual countries in the region.¹³²

All of these efforts can be summarized under the notion of the external adaptation of the Alliance, and they reflect NATO member-states' interest in creating stability across the borders to the East and South.¹³³ These efforts have become more intense and have had also substantial effects on neighbor countries. Although no immediate membership was promised, the mere hope to become a NATO member — under the precondition of

¹³⁰ Heinz Gaertner, European Security, NATO and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management, 40th Annual Convention Washington, D.C., 16-20 February 1999, available (online): <alhan.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/gah01/> [March 2000]; and Sorin Lungu, NATO Cooperation with Former Adversaries, The Historical Record, 1990-1997, Part I-V, available (online): <www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl_12/lungu_coop1.html> [March 2000] Part II-III

¹³¹ Markus Meckel, NATO on the Threshold of the 21st Century a New Strategy for Peace, Security and Stability, NATO - Political Committee, Draft General Report, 20 October 1999, pp. 8-9, available (online): <www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1999/as275pc-e.html> [March 2000]

¹³² North Atlantic Council, final communiqué, 1 December 1994, paragraph 19 - In December 1994 NATO declared to establish contacts on a case and 16+1 basis to contribute to the regional stability at NATO's periphery. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia have adapted to this NAC initiative.

¹³³ Sorin Lungu, NATO Cooperation with former Adversaries, The Historical Record, 1990-1997, spring 1999, available (online): <unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl_12/lungu_coop1.html> [March 2000]

leaving unsolved problems out of the Alliance — led several central European countries to find constructive solutions to their problems or tensions with their neighbors.

The Internal Adaptation has focused first, on creating a new, more flexible and mobile command structure. The idea behind this effort was to streamline and to shorten the chain of command, to make the organization more efficient, and to prepare it for combined operations with partners.

Second, its capability to react rapidly to crisis management missions has been improved through the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which reaffirmed NATO's initiative to support peacekeeping and other operations under UN or OSCE auspices. The idea behind this concept is to facilitate the organization of effective coalitions-of-the-willing, especially for non-Article 5 missions.

Although the formal institutionalization of the CJTF concept would take years to accomplish, a de facto CJTF was established at the end of 1995 in the form of the Implementation Force (IFOR) for Operation Joint Endeavor, the instrument for the enforcement of the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia. In addition to the Allies, IFOR ultimately included eighteen non-NATO countries, fourteen of which were NACC and PfP members.¹³⁴

Finally, at their 1996 meeting in Berlin, the NATO foreign ministers adopted the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance (ESDI). This concept created the conceptual and organizational prerequisites enabling the European members to assume increased responsibilities in terms of security policy and, using the Western European Union supported by NATO funds and capabilities, to conduct

operations within the spectrum of the WEU's Petersberg-Tasks.¹³⁵ These prerequisites include consultation procedures, command and control measures, force planning approaches, and procedures to identify and make available funds and capabilities.

The ESDI concept means a greater European capacity for autonomous military action, thanks in part to deeper political cohesion. Interest in ESDI quickened...for at least three reasons: a sense of diminished dependence on U.S. security commitments, resulting from the collapse of the Soviet empire; a determination on the part of the newly reunited Germany's European allies and partners to "embrace" Germany in a stronger common framework; and a recognition that the European NATO Allies might be wise to hedge against the risk of U.S. disengagement from European security commitments – or, at least, the possibility of U.S. nonparticipation in the management of some crises of concern to the European Allies.¹³⁶

The years after 1991 also highlighted the whole array of potential threats, the unpredictability of political developments, the great diversity of crisis potential, and the senselessness of any attempt to address problems exclusively with military means.¹³⁷ Since the 1994 summit one potential challenge provoked special efforts in NATO: the risks resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. Here, the Alliance adopted a twofold approach: On the one hand,

¹³⁴ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p.76

¹³⁵ Petersberg Tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks / peacekeeping tasks / tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; in: WEU Press Release, WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, Petersberg Declaration, paragraph 4 of Part II, 19 June 1992, available (online): <www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm> [March 2000]

¹³⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p.77

¹³⁷ Klaus Naumann, *Die NATO an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert*, Vortrag auf der zentralen Veranstaltung der Gesellschaft für Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V., 3 March 1999, available (online): <www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/NaumannVortragNATO.htm> [March 2000]

NATO politically supported the drive to stem proliferation, and on the other, it intensified its efforts to counter the evolving threat.

Finally, concrete tasks such as in Bosnia have led to a pragmatic cooperation between the various organizations responsible for European security, such as the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and NATO, but also with local refugee aid organizations and NGOs. NATO has adjusted its organizational structures in the theater and has benefited especially from expanding efforts in the civil-military-co-operation (CIMIC) field.

In summary, the situation between 1991 and 1999 changed so fundamentally and fast that there were many reasons to review the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. But despite these numerous elements of change since 1991, there can be identified some unalterable factors of continuity, which justify NATO's activities in the future. These factors include:¹³⁸

1. The political character of NATO expressed in the Washington Treaty, with its principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, constructing a framework for Alliance cohesion.

2. The importance of the transatlantic link between North America and Europe, which keeps the U.S. effectively engaged in European security affairs, including still substantial military and nuclear means as well as political and strategic commitments.

NATO still is the primary vehicle for U.S. engagement in European security matters.

¹³⁸ Klaus Wittmann, *Gewandeltes Selbstverstaendnis und erweitertes Aufgabenspektrum, Der Weg zum neuen Strategischen Konzept der NATO*, in: *Europaeische Sicherheit*, August 1999, pp. 12-19, available (online): <www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/ES99-08WittmannStrategischesKonzept.htm> [March 2000]; and David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp. 50-72

3. The key values attributed to the core task of collective defense despite the growing importance of crisis management operations.

4. The maintenance of co-operative approaches in a multilateral Alliance framework — e.g., defense planning that aims not only at ensuring the availability of required force capabilities but also at preventing NATO member countries from trying to re-nationalize their security policies. This supports the idea of suppressing historically based rivalry and competition for military primacy. NATO has institutionalized transparency and dialogue in defense planning.

5. The development of a most successful non-proliferation agreement by limiting the number of independent nuclear forces in Europe to two NATO European Allies.

6. The harmonization of national policies — providing a forum for the coordination of security policy.

7. The role of NATO for the pursuit of prosperity for the Allies. Conflicts in international economic policies are reduced and economic collaboration becomes encouraged.

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IV. THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT 1999

A. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The Washington Treaty of 1949 is NATO's cornerstone; the Strategic Concept is its framework... The Treaty sets out why you have an alliance. The Strategic Concept sets out what the alliance is, where it's going and...how it's going to get there.¹³⁹

The Washington NATO summit in late April 1999 was held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance. It was overshadowed by the war in Kosovo. Nonetheless the summit focused on the outcome of the transformation processes of the Alliance and set the course for the 21st century.

The most important document, the Alliance's Strategic Concept, was approved by the Heads of State and Government in Washington and replaced the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.¹⁴⁰

NATO is today an Alliance with a changed self-perception and an extended task spectrum. But the new NATO is not an entirely changed one, and like the Alliance's New Strategic Concept it is a mixture of old and new elements, of continuity and change. As in 1991, the Concept visualizes the adaptation processes due to the changed security

¹³⁹ Chris D. Miller, defense planning policy adviser at the U.S. Mission to NATO, in: Linda D. Kozaryn, 98535.NATO Updates Strategic Concept, in: American Forces Press Service, 1998, available (online): <www.dtic.mil/afps/news/9809083.html> [March 2000]

¹⁴⁰ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

environment. Thus, it reflects both the internal and external adaptations and changes since 1991 and experiences with the new spectrum of Allied tasks.¹⁴¹

Finally, the new strategy marks the completion of NATO's almost ten-year-long effort to adapt to the changed security environment.

The new strategy will not be a radical change from its predecessor however, because the goals of the alliance remain fundamentally the same... In the 1991 concept, NATO's broad approach to security involved dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. Those are just as valid today... What is different and worth noting is that we have taken cooperation and deepened it dramatically.¹⁴²

NATO proclaimed a readiness to adapt its own strategic basis for the first time in spring 1997. On 27 May 1997, when the participants signed the NATO-Russian Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security, NATO members stated the need to create a document in harmony with the new security environment and the new challenges and risks in the European area. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance gave instructions to revise the Concept, so as to reflect the conditions and challenges of the security environment in Europe. The NAC was asked to define Terms of Reference (TOR). These TORs were finally approved by the Foreign Ministers in December 1997 at the NATO autumn Summit in Brussels. The main goal was formulated in a rather conservative manner. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept should only be reviewed. The basic continuities and values such

¹⁴¹ Anthony Cragg, A new Strategic Concept for a new era, NATO-online library, web-edition vol. 47, No.2, Summer 1999, pp. 19-22, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-04.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁴² Chris D. Miller, in: Linda D. Kozaryn, 98535.NATO Updates Strategic Concept, American Forces Press Service, p.2, 1998, available (online): <www.dtic.mil/afps/news/9809083.html> [March 2000]

as collective defense and the transatlantic link had to be taken into account. The Policy Coordination Group (PCG) became responsible for this project.¹⁴³

The debates started at the beginning of 1998. According to the schedule the review should have been carried out in three phases. There was a time-frame of three months in which the nations could discuss parts of the 1991 Strategic Concept worth preserving. Until the spring summit the following year all the new elements had to be figured out and in the third step the formulation of the draft was to be finished by the NATO summit in December 1998.

From the very beginning up to their actual accession in March 1999, the new NATO member-states Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had been involved as observers with a right to speak. In spring 1999, Russia was informed on the status of the new Strategic Concept in the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council and the PfP-nations in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

The review of the Concept took place under different circumstances than its predecessor documents, but the general problems were the same. The PCG had to bear in mind that the document was supposed to be an unclassified one. There had to be found clear, but sensitive answers on still controversial subjects such as:

- a) range of NATO area of responsibility and interest,

¹⁴³ The PCG is a political-military body below the NAC, headed by the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Operations. The Political Counselors and the Defense Advisers represented the member states. The PCG is a principle forum for consultation and an advisory body to the NAC on politico-military matters, including peacekeeping operations, development of the CJTF concept, and in this case the review of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. in: Karl-Heinz Kamp, Arbeitspapier - Das Neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme, Sankt Augustin, August 1998, available (online): <www.kas.de/publikationen/themen/frameset.html> [March 2000]

- b) new risks and challenges,
- c) role of the United Nations, mandates for non-Article 5 operations,
- d) number and character of core functions,
- e) European Security and Defense Identity,
- f) nuclear doctrine, and
- g) structure of the new document

Additionally, the Concept had to address primarily three diverse audiences: the NATO members and the public, the military staff and the sub-organizations, and the partner countries outside the Alliance.

The overall purposes for the member-states were to strengthen the significance of the organization and to define the new fundamental security tasks as precisely as possible. Thus the document had to formulate the Alliance's *raison d'être* for the coming years without creating a document complementary to the Washington Treaty.

In view of the special relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and the nations in the different NATO programs, the document had to emphasize the unchangeable break with Cold War thinking and had to support all efforts to dismantle the antiquated way of thinking, especially in Russia itself.

The diversity of the audiences led to several severe problems. To the public, an unclassified, impressive document had to be presented. Planners expected detailed answers and conditions on critical issues for NATO future planning processes, and the future NATO candidates expected answers on the open-door policy and criteria on how to proceed with the transformation processes. Thus, the document had to be at the same

time a review of the NATO transformation process, the binding element for the member-states' policy towards security issues, and a vision for NATO's political and military future.

The International Staff submitted a first complete draft of the text in September 1998, which served as a baseline for work on the text. Only three consecutive drafts were developed, not at least because of the Kosovo crisis.

B. PROCESS OF COMPROMISE – NATIONS' DIVERSE APPROACHES

The review of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept was considerably determined by the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, on the one hand, and a broader understanding of security, on the other hand. Every nation had drawn its conclusions out of the experiences and had made public statements about what it wanted to gain from the new strategy. Thus, when the discussion started, the sense of compromise was limited. With the political and public demand for a clear and forward-looking, solid strategy and a prescribed timeline, the general national positions became more adaptable.

Every nation had its own priority list and major concern topics. The following issues covered most of the member-states' efforts. The number of documents to be presented at the Summit in Washington was discussed. The question of core security functions and scope of NATO, the demands on the national force capabilities, NATO's place in the concert of interlocking institutions, which became closely linked with the question of mandate, the embedding of the ESDI, and the nuclear policy of NATO were strongly disputed.

First, the USA: The overall goal of the U.S. during the debate about the structure and contents of the Alliance's Strategic Concept had been to ensure that NATO was willing to establish a concept responsive to future crisis. Therefore, the U.S. aimed at more flexibility and fewer restrictions.

From the beginning, the U.S. intended to present more documents on the Washington summit, like a WMD Initiative, a Defense Capability Initiative, and a vision statement. Beside the public strategic document, it was looking for an additional, classified one with more detailed information and guidance.

Concerning the scope of NATO, there had been several conflicting statements, limiting NATO, on the one side, and making it a global player for the purpose of solving problems in the Persian Gulf region and in the South China Sea, on the other side. In the question of core-functions, the U.S. has supported a broader approach to security, and generally agreed with the British intention to increase the number of fundamental security tasks. It has recommended the insertion of a fourth core-function, responding — in cooperation with partner nations — to crises, which affect stability in Europe or have implications for common interests. But, collective defense had to be the central core task.

From the U.S. perspective, the restructuring and transformation of the members' militaries have been uncoordinated. It identified the dangerous prospect of a two-tier Alliance, in which only the U.S. has the capability to lead military operations and in which European dependence on the U.S. will actually increase. Therefore it demanded a

common operational vision to ensure that the member-states' efforts toward transformation were more compatible.

The U.S. representatives have argued about the relevance of other organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, for the security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Their main argument was that NATO is the key organization for security policy operations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Other organizations have to stand comparison with the results they make. The ability of NATO to act should not be limited by a mandate of the UN, which itself often suffers from a lack of capacity to act. The consensus in the UN Security Council in the case of the Iraq invasion in Kuwait [1990-1991], or the actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina [1991-1995], can be seen only as exceptions and not the general rule. The Kosovo crisis strongly supported this argumentation.

Another important issue was the U.S. perception of the European initiative, the ESDI. The U.S. response to this has been closely connected with the Secretary Albright three "D's": Avoiding de-coupling of European decision-making from that of the Atlantic Alliance, avoiding duplication of scarce defense resources, and avoiding discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.

...ESDI can be part of the – what might be called the deepening of NATO. In that respect, it can serve as a complement to the broadening of the Alliance, as NATO reaches out to former adversaries.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address to the German Society for Foreign Policy, The New Europe and the New NATO, Bonn, Germany, 4 February 1999. available (online): <www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/newnato.htm> [March 2000]

ESDI has been seen as a part of different means to streamline NATO members' efforts and to apply to the burden-sharing aspect. In general, the U.S. supported the idea but wanted to have a close eye on the development of it.

As did the other nuclear powers, the U.S. rejected the German proposal to alter NATO's nuclear policy by working in a no-first-use pledge. The deterrence posture, including its nuclear component, should not be changed, as it would reduce the Alliance's ability to prevent crisis and war. A no-first-use policy would threaten NATO push further down the path of becoming another OSCE.

Second, Great Britain: The centerpiece of British defense planning has been the special relationship with Washington. The results and notions of the Strategic Defense Review from July 1998 reflected this and set British policy towards future war scenarios and force requirements and structures. The British position demanded more flexibility, scope, and core functions.

Beside the general agreement with the U.S., Great Britain was reluctant to accept additional documents on the Summit agenda, watering down the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

In terms of common security objectives, Great Britain wanted to expand NATO's role by two more core security functions, arguing that the organization should be prepared for missions beyond that of collective defense. Forces are expected to respond to regional instability even if there is no direct territorial risk for the Alliance.

Great Britain supported the French proposal to strengthen ESDI, especially the creation of coherent and effective military forces, but the British idea behind it was

different. Great Britain wanted to have fast results and guidance for force planning issues, and fewer ideological discussions.

Concerning the nuclear issue, all nuclear powers demanded continuity.

Third, France: Five crucial points determined the French position. First, collective defense is the main core-function of NATO. Second, there is a limited and defined geographical scope for NATO non-Article 5 missions. Third, non-Article 5 missions have to be legitimized by the UN, or the OSCE. Fourth, the development of ESDI as a means of burden-sharing between NATO and WEU is a crucial issue of concern. Fifth, the interoperability efforts not only on the technical fields, but also on the military-political and operational level, have to be enhanced as well as the developments in defense capabilities, especially in view of adaptability and flexibility.

The future role of NATO should be limited in respect to geography and content. The key objective of NATO should be the defense of the member-states' territories and not the stabilization of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. The French argument was based on the paragraph 23 of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, dealing with the scope of the Alliance.¹⁴⁵ If there are risks beyond this scope the French demanded precise definition and clear limits. The term "periphery" did not meet these requirements properly. NATO should not develop into a collective security organization competing with other organizations.

¹⁴⁵ "In defending the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for the Washington Treaty remain unchanged." in: NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000] paragraph 23

The question of mandate became a key-issue for the French. But, reality overruled the theory. Despite the general refusal of the self-legitimized NATO actions, Paris agreed to the air-campaigns against Serbia and the Yugoslavian forces.

France wanted to stress the importance of other European institutions for the security of this area — the role of the EU had to be significantly highlighted.

Fourth, Germany: Germany supported to highlight the decisive role of NATO for the stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and NATO's increasing role for the Mediterranean area, yet without creating the impression of expansionistic ambitions on the part of the Alliance. Therefore the formulations in the Concept had to be very carefully worded and the political role of NATO had to be underscored.

As for the question of the core functions, Germany emphasized the Article 5 core security function as the *conditio sine qua non* of the Atlantic Alliance. Mixing up core security functions and fundamental security tasks — as it was done in the Strategic Concept [1991], paragraph 21/23 — was seen as a danger of increasing the number of core functions and, by that, watering down the essential role of collective defense. Furthermore, to expand the number of core-functions without prioritization could lead to a fundamental change of NATO's role. It could mean an over-extension of NATO's means and it could create a notion of a fundamentally changed organization. Obviously this would have been disapproved by the German Federal Constitutional Court.

As for the question of the mandate, Germany supported the resolutions of the Brussels Summit in 1994, which emphasize the authority and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE. Germany wanted to underline the equivalent importance of the other

institutions and organizations dealing with security matters in Europe. The question of a mandate by the UN Security Council for out-of-area operations was generally fixed by the coalition agreement between the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party, which asks for a legitimization of action by the UN. Nevertheless, the Kosovo air campaign — as a single case decision — was supported by a great majority of the Bundestag [parliament]. The German position was becoming more flexible.

The ESDI and the transatlantic link were considered points. They had to be stressed by giving them a prominent role within the Strategic Concept.

The importance of nuclear weapons as a military means was considered as less important. To support the world non-proliferation regime, and to move to a policy of no-first-use, Germany wanted to downgrade the military importance of nuclear weapons. This approach was based on the German elections in September 1998, which saw an agreement among the parties to endorse the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Fifth, other members: The member-states on the flank of NATO had specific points of view according to geographical conditions and exposed positions, which have strongly influenced their views on risks and challenges. As a result, all these nations have emphasized the dominant role of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the value of continuity for the force planning process. Norway, for example, was more concerned about the reflection on the tensions between strategic partnership with Russia, on the one side, and reinsurance against Russian military potentials and instability, on the other side. Thus, Norway disagreed at first with the idea to add new core functions to the existing ones. Not surprisingly the Mediterranean member-states had different priorities from the

Northern European states. Italy favored a balance between preservation and innovation, whereas Spain mainly focused on topics and rising risks such as proliferation and terrorist acts in the Mediterranean region. There was a general consensus that stability, security, and prosperity are best guaranteed not only through the defense of the Alliance's area of responsibility, but through the expansion of stability and safeguarding of collectively perceived interests in the adjacent areas. Turkey's priority was clearly the issue of collective defense. Logically all the other additional tasks had to be subordinated to this. Turkey did not support the idea of strengthening the ESDI until the Summit, due to its inconvenient position in the WEU, the unresolved question of its EU membership, and the danger of being discriminated against.

Although the TORs did not plan the direct participation of the three new member nations, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became integrated into the process from the beginning. Their main effort was to strengthen the basics of NATO, its core functions, the transatlantic link, collective defense, and the integrated military structure with its coordinated planning process.

This sketch of the national positions has shown the huge demand for coordination and changes. Not all problems and differences could be eliminated. Only by using a more diplomatic diction, excluding controversial elements, and adding further documents and initiatives, could a consensus be found.

C. THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT - OUTCOMES

Just like the previous document of 1991, the Alliance's Strategic Concept is made up of four main parts, plus introduction and conclusion:

1. The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance
2. Strategic Perspectives
3. The Approach to Security in the 21st Century
4. Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces

The introduction gives an overview about the developments since 1991 so that historical references and comparisons could be kept to a minimum in the text.

Part I — The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance — confirms the *raison d'être* of NATO set out in the Washington Treaty. Based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the objective remains to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The indivisibility of security for all its members finds its expression in the solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance.

The fundamental security tasks are introduced in the comprehensive preamble stating the Alliance's commitment to the Washington Treaty and the UN Charter. The first three of the fundamental security tasks are formulated in nearly the same way as in the 1991 Concept. They are only modified in minor matters.¹⁴⁶ The earlier fourth core function was eliminated because its bipolar connotation was no longer considered relevant. Instead, the new tasks of the Alliance were included as instruments of a fourth

¹⁴⁶ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 10, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

fundamental security task, focusing on the enhancement of the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

In order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, co-operation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action within the Alliance.¹⁴⁷

Following the passage on the fundamental security tasks the Concept encloses:

In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.¹⁴⁸

Part II — Strategic Perspectives — addresses the changes in recent years and their generally positive aspects, but also their uncertainties and risks. The essential part NATO has played through its external and internal adaptation in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War is highlighted just as the fact that mutually reinforcing organizations have become a central feature of the security

¹⁴⁷ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 10, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁴⁸ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 11, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

environment. In this context, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is stressed. The subsequent passages refer to the OSCE, the European Union and the WEU respectively and their security functions. Stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements are addressed as another important element of the security environment.

The second section of Part II deals with security challenges and risks, a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. The enumeration of risks is remarkably functional and does not give any concrete or even geographic details. The security challenges and risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance. The risk assessment refers to ethnic and religious rivalries, to territorial disputes, to inadequate or failed efforts at reform, to the abuse of human rights, and to the dissolution of states, which can lead to local and even regional instability. It is pointed out that the resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability and that the resulting conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighboring countries, including NATO countries.

Following a remark on the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance — in reference to Russia without explicitly saying so — the Concept addresses the dangers resulting from the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. The Concept hints at the possible direct military threat to the Allies populations, territory,

and forces. It is not left unmentioned that non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

The Concept enumerates additional risks caused by the global, uncontrolled spread of technology, which constitutes an increasing danger for the information systems of modern societies. It addresses risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts.

Acknowledging that such more general threats do not necessarily call for military solutions, the Concept points to the arrangements that exist within the Alliance for consultation based on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as well as to the possible co-ordination of efforts.

Part III — The Approach to Security in the 21st Century — confirms:

The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension.¹⁴⁹

Again, it emphasize the collective aim:

...to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organizations are complementary

¹⁴⁹ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 25, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises.¹⁵⁰

In this context, NATO remains the essential forum for consultation.

The following measures are identified as a key-instruments to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability: First, the preservation of the transatlantic link; second, the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defense and to fulfil the full range of its missions; and third, the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.

In the ESDI context, the Concept refers to the Berlin decisions of June 1996 and their implementation, as well as the resulting necessity for close co-operation between NATO, the WEU and, to an ever-growing extent, the European Union.¹⁵¹ Here and in statements on the strategic environment, the efforts of the European Allies are emphasized and strengthened to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of shared responsibilities and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership. Beyond current agreements between NATO and the WEU, the perspective of an evolving European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union as part of the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty is explicitly highlighted.

¹⁵⁰ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 25, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁵¹ Joerk-Eckart Reschke, Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentitaet: eine politische Vision oder ein konkreter Realisierungprozeß?, in: Soldat und Technik, February 1999, available (online): <www.baks.com/442reschke1.html> [March 2000]

A central passage of the Strategic Concept is paragraph 31 on conflict prevention and crisis management. It describes NATO's efforts, in co-operation with other organizations:

...to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations...often involves the participation of NATO's Partners.¹⁵²

The Concept recalls NATO's offer, made in Brussels in 1994,

...to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.¹⁵³

In the same context, the Concept recalls the Alliance's subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations on the Balkans, including both the operations in Bosnia under UN mandate and the decisions of the Alliance in the case of Kosovo. This explicitly points out the splits between the French and the American point of view. It hints both at the link between the responsibilities of the UN and NATO and the sovereign right of NATO to act without a direct UN mandate.

Another sub-section addresses aspects of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, which are not an end in themselves but a means to promote security and stability

¹⁵² NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 31, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁵³ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 31, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain an important forum for co-operation and consultation. Under its roof, the Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for intensifying practical security links and for enhancing interoperability between the Alliance and its Partners. Through detailed co-operation and exercise programs, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in defense planning and budgets, democratic control of defense forces, and the ability to take part in NATO-led PfP-operations. The Concept stresses that the Alliance will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if the Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security — in accordance with the Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, thus providing a second-degree security guarantee.

As for the Alliance's external relationships, the Concept particularly emphasizes the relationship with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean countries:

1. The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security, through which

...NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security...¹⁵⁴

2. The Charter between NATO and Ukraine, whose

¹⁵⁴ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 36, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

...sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state are considered as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.¹⁵⁵

3. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of NATO's cooperative approach to security. It underlines the global responsibility for the entire European region.

As for NATO enlargement, the Strategic Concept confines itself to merely stating the principles of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. The related political questions were left to the Summit Communiqué. The Concept points out that no European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration as a new member.

Statements on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation complete the Part on the Alliance's approach to security. It stresses that the Allies seek

...to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defense and to fulfil the full range of its missions...¹⁵⁶

The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements, as well as to confidence and security building measures, without going into detail.

¹⁵⁵ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 37, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁵⁶ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 40, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

Part IV — Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces — sets the actual course for defense and armed force planning. As principles of allied strategy, the following aspects are emphasized in the introduction: solidarity and strategic unity and indivisible security of the Allies. In this context, the document highlights the transatlantic link, the presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, an equitable sharing of the roles, risks, and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defense and the development of the ESDI within the Alliance.

The practical arrangements that enable the allies to conduct collective defense and combined crisis response operations and that permit a coherent response of the Alliance to all kinds of emergencies are referred to in the paragraph 43.

The requirements for an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces is repeated in the Concept, as well as the statement that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression incalculable and unacceptable.

As opposed to the previous document, the missions of the Alliance military forces — paragraph 47-50 — no longer distinguish between peace, crisis, and war. Instead, the missions are described in functional terms: deterrence, defense, maintenance or restoration of the territorial integrity of Allied nations, and rapid termination of war are classical missions which are now complemented by conflict prevention, crisis response operations, as well as operations in support of other international organizations. This also includes support of European operations under the control of the WEU, or of the European Union. Particular emphasis is given to the fact that crisis response operations may be as demanding as defense missions. Moreover, the Concept addresses the role of

allied military forces with a view to the Partnership for Peace as well as with regard to NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

The Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture state that the size, readiness, availability, and deployment of the Alliance's military forces reflect its commitment to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions and respond to future challenges. In this context, the Concept stresses the importance of the integrated command structure and the requirements in terms of the capability to deploy, mobility, the survivability of forces and infrastructure, as well as sustainability.

In light of lessons learned in recent years, especially during multinational operations, some issues are stressed as being of particular importance. It identifies the need of increased interoperability [in all its facets to include the qualification, training and experience of personnel] and advanced technology for information superiority. It enumerates the overall requirements for reaction forces and for reinforcement, the mobilization and build-up capabilities, and the measures to counter the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.

The former force categories — reaction forces, main defense forces, and reinforcement forces — were abandoned to give more leeway for national planning. This decision also reflects on diverging interests — e.g., the different priorities given to collective defense, on the one hand, and to an intervention capability, on the other.

The following paragraphs [54-64], deal with military tasks, the new logistic challenges, and standards for conventional forces, and ends with statements on the characteristics of nuclear forces. Compared to the first draft, in which nothing relating to

the nuclear issue was changed, the new document offered slight changes. The Concept admits that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by the Alliance are extremely remote. As a result of the changes in the post-Cold War environment the Concept stresses the steps taken since 1991, such as the reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces, the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and the fact that NATO will no longer target any country. The Alliance concluded that it is counterproductive to do a step forward to changes in the nuclear policy, questioning the first-use-option.

Nuclear force

...will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option... The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link.¹⁵⁷

The Alliance's Strategic Concepts certainly leaves questions unresolved. During the one-and-a-half-year review the different views of the member-states had to be constantly coordinated and adjusted. Until the deadline at the summit there were still unresolved issues. In order to get a unanimous decision in the end all nations had to make compromises. However, the result of sixty-five paragraphs is more than the number indicates. Despite the critical Kosovo crisis, the negative consequences of the

¹⁵⁷ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., paragraph 62-64, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

peace-dividend issue, and national restraints, the member-states managed to overcome their own doubts and adopt the concept just in time.

In the end the concept is based on the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of 1991 and is still harmonized with the ideals of the Washington Treaty.

It is a viable conceptual basis, which includes all important statements on the mission and role of NATO on its way into the 21st century, sometimes interpretable so as to reconcile diverging positions. It provides a sufficiently clear basis for the further development of NATO's armed forces to enable them to perform the entire spectrum of their tasks.

Irrespective of all deficiencies, the German side can be particularly satisfied with the results produced on the following issues:¹⁵⁸

1. The Concept clearly underlines the unchanged fundamental significance of collective defense and the transatlantic link as indispensable features of the Alliance and as prerequisites for its ability to perform the entire spectrum of its tasks.

2. These political and military capabilities are, at the same time, the basis for conflict prevention and crisis management, partnership and co-operation — tasks, which are more relevant for the moment.

3. As opposed to 1991, the Concept clearly stresses a considerable shift of emphasis towards these tasks, while still preserving the political and military basis of a reliable defense capability.

¹⁵⁸ Klaus Wittmann, Gewandeltes Selbstverstaendnis und erweitertes Aufgabenspektrum, Der Weg zum neuen Strategischen Konzept der NATO, in: Europaeische Sicherheit, August 1999, pp. 12-19, available (online): <www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/ES99-08WittmannStrategischesKonzept.htm> [March 2000]

4. As far as the guidelines for the Alliance's force posture are concerned, the capabilities of the armed forces are well balanced to ensure a uniform basis of military capabilities across the entire task spectrum.

5. Given the large number of different national interests and ideas, satisfactory compromises have been found regarding the further development of the armed forces, both in terms of concepts and concrete specifications.

6. With a view to the geographic reach of NATO, the orientation towards the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area prevailed. NATO will not become a globally acting power.

7. As far as the mandate for non-Article 5 operations is concerned, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for global peace and international security is preserved. On an exceptional basis, however, the Concept does not preclude the possibility of NATO-led non-Article 5 operations in individual cases even without an explicit mandate but upon unanimous consent of all NATO members and in line with international law.

8. The Concept stresses the European dimension of the Alliance, to include support to European-led operations by NATO assets and capabilities. Moreover, the perspective of a European Security and Defense Policy in line with the Amsterdam Treaty is intentionally left open.

9. The fundamental political role of nuclear weapons remains a principle. Even though any contemplation regarding their use is considered to be extremely remote, they

retain their key value in demonstrating that any kind of aggression is not a rational option.

D. ADDITIONAL SUMMIT DOCUMENTS

If one were to ask the average newspaper reader what the NATO Summit in Washington was about, the first answer would probably be to deal with the crisis in Kosovo. Well, that's partly true... Ask the same question a few months ago, and the answer would have been to celebrate the admission of the three new members and the 50-year success story of the Alliance. This is also partly true ... Although overshadowed by Kosovo and the temptation to look back at the past 50 years, what the Summit was really about was looking ahead to ensure that NATO is prepared to handle the challenges of the next 50 years...¹⁵⁹

The whole Summit agenda lays out a substantial number of agreements and initiatives related to diverse NATO issues aligning member-states as well as partners and cooperative nations to NATO's way of solving future security problems.

The main thread behind this was to bring NATO theory into line with practice by providing common agreed statements on specific hot-spot issues. NATO agreed on how to coordinate the work with partners based on feedback and guidance. It gave a strong endorsement to the further enlargement of NATO, offered a carefully balanced formula for the evolution of the European role within NATO, and returned to internal issues by agreeing on common concepts.

¹⁵⁹ Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Evaluates NATO 50 Summit, 5 November 1999, in: Security Issue Digest No. 90, 1999, available (online): <usa.grmbl.com/s19990511o.html> [March 2000]

The Washington Declaration pays homage to the founding fathers of the Alliance and their ideas.¹⁶⁰ In only nine paragraphs, short and clear like the Washington Treaty, the Heads of State and Government commit themselves to the core values, purposes, and principles of the Alliance, and confirm their efforts to stand firm against new security challenges like terrorism. The cohesion, the solidarity, the transatlantic link and the vision to build a Europe whole and free based on the principles of the Charter of the UN are the main subjects at which this Declaration is hinting. The coincidence with the Kosovo crisis provides a reasonable basis for the joint effort to enhance Euro-Atlantic security and stability — the new fourth fundamental security function of the Concept.

The Heads of State and Government presented a special Statement on Kosovo, underlining the high priority of stability in Southeast Europe for the transatlantic agenda. NATO's military actions are the result of the threat against the core values of NATO, like the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Therefore NATO members could agree on a detailed list of objectives directed against the Milosevic-regime. Remarkably the essential role of the UN and the EU for NATO's military action is highlighted in the second paragraph of this Statement, whereas the OSCE, as a tool for cooperation among the governments, is only mentioned at the end of the document. This hints at the perception of NATO being a jewel in the "triple crown strategy" [security, prosperity, and democracy] within the hierarchy of European Security bodies — NATO as the first

¹⁶⁰ NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)63, The Washington Declaration, 23 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm> [March 2000]

resort in security activities, the EU more responsible for economic security, and the OSCE for overseeing human rights and democracy.¹⁶¹

Additionally to verify NATO's engagement, the meeting of the NAC at the level of Heads of State and Government with countries in the region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia underscored the close cooperation and coordination efforts between NATO and states affected by the conflict.¹⁶²

Supporting the elaborated non-Article 5 mission statement in the Concept, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the member countries of the EAPC met in Washington, to discuss the increased importance of crisis management as well as partnership and cooperation. Again, the Kosovo crisis underlined the importance of the EAPC as a framework for consultation on political and security-related issues and PfP as the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners.¹⁶³ In this context the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP published a report, that invited the Heads of State and Government

...to endorse new measures to further develop an enhanced and more operational Partnership to meet the challenges of the next century.
...endorse the Political Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations, the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, and

¹⁶¹ Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, U.S., Remarks at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 9 November 1998, available (online): <www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/s981109a.htm>..[March 2000]

¹⁶² NATO Press Release, NAC+7-S(99)70, Chairman's Summary, Meeting of the NAC at the level of Heads of State and Government with Countries in the Region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 25 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-070e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁶³ NATO Press Release, EAPC-S(99)67, Chairman's summary of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Summit Level, 25 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-067e.htm> [March 2000]

the more robust practical cooperation ... introduce, as a new element of the enhanced and more operational Partnership, an Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led operations.¹⁶⁴

These steps are the foundation on which the Partner's operational capabilities can be improved. They offer opportunities to make PfP more operational, which in the future will involve non-member-states much closer in future cooperation, NATO-led, non-Article 5 missions.

Another subject matter covered by Summit documents was the further enlargement policy of the Alliance. Getting a robust and credible Open-Door policy has been one of the key challenges during the Washington Summit. In order to reduce the pressure to name and schedule the next wave of new members, and, at the same time, bind new countries without having to extend the full rights of membership to them, the Alliance further developed the PfP-program by agreeing on a Membership Action Plan (MAP).¹⁶⁵ The MAP gives the aspiring members more feedback and guidance on their defense reform and on their modernization efforts and covers political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal issues. Thus it specifies the more general remarks on enlargement within the Strategy [paragraph 39] and leaves more time for further enlargement steps.

¹⁶⁴ Political Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century - The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership, 15 June 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615a.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁶⁵ NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm> [March 2000]

The Washington Summit was also the first Summit meeting of the NATO-Ukraine-Commission, symbolizing the importance of common stabilization efforts for Ukraine. Especially in view of the joint operation in Kosovo, the distinctive relationship and the nucleus of the Commission provide further starting points for deepening cooperation.

A further key decision at the Summit had been the agreement on the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI).¹⁶⁶ The debates over the Revolution in Military Affairs, Information Warfare, key points from the U.S. Joint Vision 2010, and others made clear that the European nations and the U.S. are modernizing and restructuring their forces at different rates. The DCI aims at streamlining the national forces efforts, especially for non-Article 5 operations to improve mobility, effective engagement, survivability, sustainability, and command and control, to get away from overly large, standing forces. Again, the lessons learned in Kosovo led to a strong commitment in this regard. The DCI is closely connected with the further evolution of the ESDI. In the past, ESDI focused almost on institutional arrangements, but current discussions reveal the importance of capabilities and assets. Thus, the principle success of ESDI will strongly depend on two factors: the European states credible efforts to adapt their forces to the full spectrum of NATO missions, and a strategy to convince the U.S. of the benefits of this idea.

The last remarkable Summit decision concerned threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The threat became real during the Gulf War and made clear the necessity of sharing intelligence and of cooperation in the field of defense. The Initiative

is subdivided in five parts and covers information-sharing, defense planning, consultation on national non-proliferation assistance to other nations, civilian protection, and the establishment of a WMD center at NATO HQs.¹⁶⁷

This whole Summit agenda was overshadowed, but not dominated, by the Kosovo crisis. Behind the scenes a lot of work had to be done to find consensus on the critical issues, to finalize the papers, communiqués, initiatives and declarations, in order to make the Summit to a successful one.

Nevertheless a detailed NATO policy towards crisis management was missing. Obviously the members did not intend to focus too much on the crisis management issue because NATO wanted to emphasize collective defense, which is still the comprehensive "cramp" and one of the main reason for the attractiveness of the Alliance.

Also missing was a comprehensive concept for arms control and disarmament. The hint at the different treaties, conventions, and arms control arrangements in the Strategic Concept [paragraph. 40], and the principal statement to continue these efforts, as it is summarized in the Washington Summit Communiqué [paragraph 32-35], do not really push NATO to a more effective arms control and disarmament policy. This might be caused by the different national approaches regarding this matter, or, more simply, because of a lack of time to coordinate these efforts in detail. In the process of formulation no-member-states really wanted to deepen dividing lines among the Allies

¹⁶⁶ NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)69, Defence Capabilities Initiative, 25 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁶⁷ NATO Press Release, NATO Washington Summit - Fact sheet: NATO on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.usia.gov/topical/pol/nato50/text/99042409.htm> [March 2000]

due to an uncontrollable public discussion about nuclear and conventional arms control or unilateral arms reductions. Especially the nuclear issue became a "non-issue" after presenting single no-first-use statements. Nevertheless, such a step forward would have been a strong signal to underline the non-proliferation intention of NATO.

E. NATO'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

To be sure the new Strategic Concept leaves certain issues unresolved. In editorial terms, it could have been shortened and many repetitions could have been avoided. In conceptual terms it would have been preferable to integrate some more detailed statements on specific topics to demonstrate that NATO has done its conceptual homework. The Strategic Concept had to draw individual elements of the NATO agenda into a single, coherent strategic framework. Enlargement, as well as crisis management, European defense, the partnership with Russia, the different forums of consultation and co-operation, nuclear policy, and other issues, all had to become organic parts of a coherent security strategy. Nonetheless, some of the critical long-term issues have been open to interpretation and changes.

The Concept was written at a time when the end of political developments and transformation processes were hard to grasp and to predict. The fundamental change in the course of NATO was set by the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, nine years earlier. Thus, the Concept suffers from the unpredictability of future developments, on the one hand, and the absence of radical changes in the orientation of NATO since 1991, on the

other hand. The shift of NATO strategies in the past five decades had been much more fundamental.

NATO remains the world's only multinational, integrated, and militarily effective alliance at the disposal of political leaders. But considerable thought and attention must also be given to the other existing institutions and the manner by which all these should relate to each other. There is no consensus in the Alliance concerning how best to characterize the international system emerging after the Cold War. NATO members accepted the role of other organizations dealing with European security matters in general. The experiences with the UN and the OSCE in the Balkans have been important in this regard. But the coordination of efforts is still not fully developed. The Concept's formulation on the respective roles of the EU — which is also enlarging its membership and is developing a security component through the Common Security and Foreign Policy — and NATO for the defense and security in the Euro-Atlantic area are only general and harmless.¹⁶⁸ The Concept has stressed the need of compatibility between the Amsterdam Treaty and the Washington Treaty and has pointed out that further developments within the EU and the WEU will have implications for all NATO members. But, there is no hint at further steps to increase cooperation, to build up consultation forums, or to coordinate effectively the efforts of both organizations. Nothing has been said about the consequences of merging the WEU with the EU. Agreed cooperation mechanisms exist with the WEU, but there is no direct link or arrangements

¹⁶⁸ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., UN, OSCE, WEU and EU, paragraph 14, 17, 30, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

with the EU now. It is still an unresolved question as to avoid duplication of structures, means, and assets, and how to avoid subtraction of forces from NATO, and nothing has been said about coordinating the existing policies in various areas, like the Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO) and the Barcelona Process (EU).¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, due to the fact that the nations in both organizations are not the same, distinct reservations exist in non-EU, NATO nations about supporting the EU with means and assets. The fear of discrimination has been most clearly expressed by Norway and Turkey.¹⁷⁰ The Strategic Concept does not even hint at this problem. Further difficulties are foreseeable with the enlargement of NATO and/or the EU. This again is a problem which has to be solved in common forums and decision-making circles. If NATO-EU roles in transatlantic security affairs are not specifically defined, each organisation and its members could lock themselves onto paths that in the future could end up in divergent and conflicting situations, which would then be difficult to correct.

The function and significance of the military factor in support of crisis response operations as part of non-Article 5 operations is open to national interpretation. The Concept does not determine when and how NATO should deal with the new risks like terrorism, proliferation, mass migration, and other possible threats, and does not

¹⁶⁹NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., Mediterranean Dialogue: paragraph 38 and 50, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁷⁰ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Special Reports, ESDI Steering Group, Madrid, 17 December 1999, available (online): <www.naa.be/publications/special/at10esdi002.html> [March 2000]

specifically explain which role the military component will play in this context.¹⁷¹ The Concept demands effective conflict prevention and crisis management facilities and for military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. Military means have to contribute to promoting cooperation and understanding with NATO's partners and other states and have to deter the use of NBC weapons and to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. Asking for an optimum balance of conventional forces does not provide an answer as to the significance and function of the military to support crisis response operations.

The benefit from preparedness for collective defense, operations, which are extremely unlikely and are very cost-intensive, has not really been worked out.¹⁷² The Strategic Concept underlines the importance of collective defense only in general terms. It is NATO's basis for credibility, it is the foundation for security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and it plays a key role in reinforcing solidarity. Additionally the political, military, and resource advantages of collective defense are mentioned in one sentence, hardly enough to convince the public and the military planners of the vast efforts being made to maintain the preparedness of collective defense.

Using indistinct and vague terms leads to national misperceptions and diverse interpretations and therefore to lack of credibility and misunderstandings. Especially the Germans tried hard to achieve improvements in standardising terminology because, e.g.,

¹⁷¹ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., military capabilities - crisis response operations: paragraph 10, 29, 31, 41, 43, 47, 49, 52, 53, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

it no longer makes sense to use the term "peacekeeping" in a wider sense if the same term is used as a subordinate concept. It does not make sense to use terms such as "crisis response operations" [USA], "peace missions" [Germany], and "crisis management and peacekeeping" [France] for the same operations, though they imply different things.¹⁷³ Additionally, different passages show that the inclination to repeat communiqué language could not always be avoided.¹⁷⁴

The change in structure led to repetition and lack of clarity. Typical compromises, which could not be avoided and which did not necessarily contribute to the quality of the documents had to be made in formal terms. There was such an irreconcilable conflict between those who wanted to preserve the structure of the 1991 document and those who wanted to place the programmatic statements on purpose and tasks at the beginning, that the contents of the former Part II were split up. Now one part precedes the description of the security environment and risks while the other is placed behind this paragraph.

The number of core functions best expresses the dilemma of agreed diplomatic political formulation, on one side, and making use of this for military planning processes, on the other side. The diverging positions on the number of fundamental security tasks

¹⁷²NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., collective defense: paragraph 4, 27, 30, 40, 41, 43, 47, 49, 52-54, 58, 61, 65, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁷³ Andrew J. Pierre, NATO at Fifty - New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, in: United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 22 May 1999, pp. 8-10, available (online): <www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322/sr990322.html> [March 2000]

¹⁷⁴ Markus Spillmann, Gewandeltes Selbstverstaendnis der NATO, in: NZZ Online Dossiers, 26 April 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990426msn2.htm> [March 2000]

could only be reconciled by means of a compromise.¹⁷⁵ One side argued for four tasks — the fourth to describe all new tasks — to prevent an implicit degradation of the significance of collective defense by attributing excessive importance to new core functions. The others wanted to integrate crisis management and partnership/cooperation as two new separate core functions, claiming that the purpose of NATO and the necessity of armed forces would have to be justified vis-à-vis public and parliaments in the future mainly under this aspect. The compromise was found in a formulation which, for some people, refers to four core functions, while it allows others to find five core functions in the document or read them into it.

The dramatic changes in the security environment led to the review of the Strategic Concept. Specifically NATO's enlargement, the changes in the relationship with Russia, France's closer cooperation with NATO, the developing Common Foreign and Security Policy among the members of the EU forced the Allies to give more thorough attention to NATO's nuclear policy and the existing consultation mechanism. Nonetheless, aside from minor changes, the nuclear policy qualitatively remained as it was in 1991. There is no additional support for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In fact, the signal of maintaining the policy works against the intended comprehensive concept for arms control and disarmament.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, if the

¹⁷⁵NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., fundamental security tasks: paragraph 10, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁷⁶ Karl-Heinz Kamp, Das Neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme, Arbeitspapier, Bereich Forschung und Beratung - Internationale Politik -, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, August 1998, p. 23-25, available (online): <www.kas.de/publikationen/themen/frameset.html> [March 2000]; and Andrew J. Pierre, NATO at Fifty - New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, in: United States

Common Foreign Security Policy of the EU will be inconsistent with NATO's nuclear policy, the viability of NATO's current nuclear doctrine is questionable.

As the Alliance continues to adjust to these very positive and profound developments, it still must address negative dynamics, rising animosities, and political tensions. The Alliance has to take into account geopolitical, economic, and technological variables that are global in character and will have an impact on NATO's members. The scourge of war has not been eliminated. Each of the developments confronts the Alliance and its core missions with new challenges, responsibilities, and opportunities. Nonetheless, the debate on weapons of mass destruction has shown the member-states' concerns about how far NATO should move beyond its traditional role — the collective defense of its member — and about the costs.¹⁷⁷ All these aspects had to be taken into account in the Concept. In this regard, the Strategic Concept fails to address risks and threats in detail and does not provide clear ways and means and time limits to achieve the necessary force adaptations. This is certainly caused by the unclassified character of the document, but this cannot be used as an excuse for the failure of the political leaders to address risks and challenges.

NATO's upcoming debate of how to handle strategic challenges should address not only policy and strategy, but also the details of defense budgets and programs. The Concept does not even mention the question of budget constraints and only touches upon

Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 22 May 1999, pp. 14-16, available (online): <www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322/sr990322.html> [March 2000]

¹⁷⁷ John C. Kornblum, Amerika - Fuehrungsrolle ja, Weltpolizist nein, in: NZZ Online Dossiers, 30 March 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990330_kornblum.htm> [March 2000]

the opportunities of NATO standardization.¹⁷⁸ To streamline the national approaches more preconditions should have been set. Additional investment funds will be necessary if the member nations are to pursue such critical initiatives like DCI, WMD, and peace support missions, power projection and fair burden sharing. The tradeoff between quantity and quality has to be fixed. The initiatives call for mobility, compatibility, sustainability, and survivability, but do they really close the technology gap across the Atlantic? Rhetoric and facts are quite different.

Another matter of concern is the definition of area of responsibility (AOR) and area of interest (AOI), the scope of NATO.¹⁷⁹ There are diverse national views on this issue.¹⁸⁰ Extending the notion of security, as it was intended in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept in 1991, NATO became more involved in crisis management and conflict prevention issues. This initiated an open discussion about defining security and security policy. The Cold War agreement on what is meant by security became obsolete. Terms such as "security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area", "security in the global context", "the ability to reinforce any area at risk", and "security interests affected by other risks of a wider nature", are now watering down the old geographical limit of NATO actions and are giving leeway for national interpretation, for perceptions and

¹⁷⁸ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., standardization: paragraph 43, 59, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁷⁹ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., AOR / AOI: paragraph 6, 10, 12, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 50, 59, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁸⁰ Andrew J. Pierre, NATO at Fifty - New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, in: United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 22 May 1999, pp. 10-11, available (online): <[www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322.html](http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322/sr990322.html)> [March 2000]

misperceptions.¹⁸¹ The less geographical and functional limitation a system imposes upon itself, the less clear the limits are visible within those it moves, acts and develops. The more diffuse its term of security and stability is, the less estimable it is in the eyes of third parties. Such a system increases the security dilemma. However, if NATO does not flexibly correspond to the new security environment, it becomes incapable of solving the problems that could lead again to unilateral, national security policies. Despite the Strategic Concept, these issues are still open to discussion. Decisions have just been shifted to further debates on a case-by-case basis, which can lead to a weakening of Alliance's cohesion and solidarity in case of tensions and threats to security.

NATO and out-of-area operations are still a matter of concern. This can be interpreted as a positive signal for adaptability in the future or as a sign of the absence of consensus. Nevertheless, in the case of out-of-area threats, nations could find answers on a case-by-case basis, as in the coalition that ousted Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait in the 43-day Persian Gulf War in early 1991 and the involvement of NATO nations in

¹⁸¹ Ulrich Schmid, Scheu vor grossen Antworten am Nato-Gipfel in Washington, NZZ Online Dossiers, 26 April 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990426usd.htm> [March 2000]; and "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind." in: NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999, paragraph 24, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

the Balkans.¹⁸² However, many EU members who are Allies wanted NATO's Strategic Concept to state that NATO will undertake out-of-area operations only within a UN mandate.¹⁸³ Therefore, it is a question of the future setting of tasks and authorization for NATO under three aspects: that of functional legitimization, that of geographical limitation, and that of the commitment to international law. Under what circumstances should NATO threaten the use of force? How far should NATO's writ extend geographically and what is the legal basis for the threat or use of force by NATO in any of these situations?¹⁸⁴ In all three points the cancellation of previous limitations — as seen in the statements within the Strategic Concept — had been the goal.¹⁸⁵ NATO preserves its freedom to act and it always seeks to act in unison, preferable with a mandate from the UN or the OSCE, the framework for collective security. The question is what happens with NATO's freedom of action if the CFSP of the EU provides that a UN mandate is a necessary precondition for an operation? How does this affect the ability of the Alliance to foster consensus behind military actions when a UN mandate is unattainable? A central factor in this regard will be the general understanding of the

¹⁸² Stewart M. Powell, A Half Century of NATO, in: Airforce Magazine, vol.82, No.4, April 1999, available (online): <www.afa.org/magazine/0499nato.html> [March 2000]

¹⁸³ August Pradetto, Zurueck zu den Interessen - Das Strategische Konzept der NATO und die Lehren des Krieges, in: Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik, July 1999, available (online): <www.unibw-hamburg.de/WWEB/soz/pradetto/interessen.htm> [March 2000]; and Andrew J. Pierre, NATO at Fifty - New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, in: United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 22 May 1999, pp. 11-13, available (online): <www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322/sr990322.html> [March 2000]

¹⁸⁴ Ivo H. Daadler, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force, in: The Brooking Institution, March 1999, available (online): <www.unausa.org/issues/sc/daalder.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁸⁵ NATO Press Release, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., out-of-area issue: paragraph 6, 10, 12, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 50, 59, 24 April 1999, available (online): <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [March 2000]

sharing, not dividing, of burdens and responsibilities. However, all efforts looking for coalitions-of-the-willing must be seen as opposing efforts. When the rule of law, democracy, and human rights are the foundation of the spirit of the Alliance, coalitions-of-the-willing will undermine the idea of consensus and common efforts to security and by that will weaken NATO's credibility. The Strategic Concept tries to cover this through a positive representation of European efforts in the framework of ESDI, which means within NATO structures, but cannot find a clear and straightforward answer on this issue.

As an Alliance of democracies NATO, more than other military alliances in history, relies on both public and parliamentary support. The frictions during the development of the Concept have revealed the discrepancies between the nations in security matters. Since the end of the Cold War the nations have been more free in their decision making, based on the fact that a direct life-threatening situation is considered remote. A single common strategy for the Mediterranean area for example could not be formulated and developed within the Strategic Concept. The basic reason for this was that the security interests of the members have been too divergent to find a common solution. For the European states, directly concerned, like Italy and Spain, political instability and the economic under-development are the main factors of risk. For the U.S. the Mediterranean area is purely important for strategic reasons, being the vital sealanes for the Persian Gulf area and Central Asia. From that American, global perspective the proliferation of WMD and terrorism plays the decisive role in the evaluation of the security situation in the Mediterranean area. For this reason, the subject of WMD is

increasingly becoming a NATO problem within the Article 5 — collective defense — spectrum. It remains questionable how much the European partners are ready to accept the instrumentalization of NATO for Mediterranean issues.¹⁸⁶

Enlargement raises a number of difficult questions, too. How should enlargement unfold in the future? What should be the standards for selecting new members? What is NATO trying to achieve by enlarging further? In paragraph 12, 26, 33, and more specifically in paragraph 39 of the Strategic Concept NATO refers to its idea of enlargement and tries to cover this issue with general remarks.¹⁸⁷ A NATO open-door policy driven by only a loose set of political standards could have a detrimental effect on both NATO and Europe. The NATO approach to enlargement needs a stronger strategic focus. The Strategic Concept tends to focus too much on the political merits of each aspiring state, rather than on the Alliance's goals and strategic causes, or the theater-wide implications of admitting new members.¹⁸⁸ A significantly larger Alliance might not produce a more stable Europe. It might have a destabilizing effect when rogue states are unimpressed by a larger NATO, whose political will and military power to contest aggression are diminished. NATO must preserve its character as an effective military alliance to be safeguarded against unexpected surprises and to project power and

¹⁸⁶ Fred Tanner, Wachsende Bedeutung der Nato-Suedregion, in: NZZ Online Dossiers, 30 March 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990330_tanner.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁸⁷ Andrew J. Pierre, NATO at Fifty - New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, in: United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 22 May 1999, available (online): <www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990322/sr990322.html> [March 2000] pp. 3-8

¹⁸⁸ Lothar Ruehl, Neues Denken ueber die Osterweiterung der Nato, in: NZZ Online Dossiers, 30 March 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990717_ruehl.htm> [March 2000]

stability.¹⁸⁹ Additionally NATO needs to consider how Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS states fit into the enlargement calculus.¹⁹⁰ The Concept does not even hint at this issue.

Over three decades ago (1961-1966), when there was a necessity of choice, NATO initiated a process that ended up as the Harmel Report of 1967. This report brought valued clarity to the fundamental purposes of the Alliance at a time of shifting East-West relationships. A report, like the Harmel Report, to respond to today's fundamental question is missing. What should the transatlantic political and security architecture look like and where is the place of the Alliance in world affairs in the coming decades? The overall goal of the Strategic Concept should have been to deepen the power of cohesion within the Alliance and to find clear, credible, and common approaches to the future problems. The member-states missed the chance to close the gap between rhetoric and reality and to reaffirm the necessity of the Alliance.

¹⁸⁹ N.N., Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik (editor), Seminar fuer Sicherheitspolitik 1998, Ergebnis AG B Kernseminar 1998, NATO und EU Mitgliedschaften - Kongruenz oder differenzierte Gestaltung, 1988, available (online): <www.baks.com/4198B.html> [March 2000]

¹⁹⁰ Ivo H. Daadler, NATO at 50: The Summit & Beyond, in: The Brooking Institution, Policy Brief No. 48, April 1999, available (online): <www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb048/pb48.htm> [March 2000]

V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR NATO'S ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

How valuable is NATO? During the last five decades NATO protected its members against any exterior threat, strengthened democratic institutions, aided enhanced prosperity throughout the region, helped pacify intra-European disputes, and resolved security dilemmas that once spawned conflict and war.¹⁹¹ These tasks will be fulfilled in the future as well. Despite discrepancies in national security policy efforts, NATO will be the framework for cohesion and solidarity and thereby will deepen the common roots. In this organization the most potent economic powers are united. Its policy is cooperative, future-oriented, and will project this practice and custom into Central Europe. NATO will keep its power, cohesion, and attractiveness if it keeps to this positive approach to security.

NATO has never been a one-dimensional Alliance. It has always been a means to deal with the foreign, security, and domestic policies of its sovereign members. The Alliance has always been far more than an insurance policy against a threat from the East. It is at the same time an alliance of values, norms, and common interests, a defense alliance, and a consultative forum for the benefit of all. The basis for this process has always been cooperation. NATO has always been a team. Its huge experiences in cooperation, its organized mechanism to build consent, and its foundation on trust are the factors the member-states benefit from. With the transformation process, starting at the

¹⁹¹ Ivo H. Daadler, NATO at 50: The Summit & Beyond, in: The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief No. 48, April 1999, available (online): <www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb048/pb48.htm> [March 2000]

end of the 1980s, NATO has adapted to the changed environment. It added partnership, cooperation, crisis management, and conflict prevention to the range of tasks it is responsible for and orientated itself toward supporting the difficult transformation of the Central European states.¹⁹²

The pact will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union and, come what may, will survive it.¹⁹³

NATO is a community of values, based on democracy, rule of law, human rights and prosperity. It binds sovereign nations but it is not supranational. The member-states have strong and continuing mutual interest in sustaining and improving political, economic and military cooperation among themselves. This not only helps to maintain peaceful and prosperous relationships among the member-states, but it also serves as a critical building block of stability for a general security system for the Euro-Atlantic area. The transatlantic Alliance is at the center of a cooperative European security system. NATO is the principal forum for discussions of European security issues and for resolving security problems arising on the continent, including threats to peace and stability at the periphery of the NATO area.

¹⁹² Markus Meckel, NATO on the Threshold of the 21st Century a New Strategy for Peace, Security and Stability, in: Committee Reports North Atlantic Assembly, 20 October 1999, available (online): <www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1999/as275pc-e.html> [March 2000]

¹⁹³ Hans Ruehle, Grosse Probleme erfordern grosse Entscheidungen, in: NZZ Online Dossiers, 30 March 1999, available (online): <www.nzz.ch/online/02_dossiers/dossiers1999/nato/nato990330_ruehle.htm> [March 2000]

New challenges require continued cooperation. The challenges are numerous and in many ways more complex. These challenges will not always require military responses, but maintaining collective defense capabilities will serve as a critical back-up for successful diplomatic resolutions. Thus, NATO is still a collective defense system. The commitment of all Allies to collective defense demonstrates clearly the will to defend common values and interests, if necessary with force. From it flows all the benefits of joint planning, transparency, non-renationalization of defense, and cooperative behavior.

The Washington Treaty of 1949 provides a broad and flexible mandate for the response to the risks and challenges of the future. Even the dramatic changes with the end of the Cold War and the loss of the enemy could not diminish the benefits from and the credibility of the organization. Although shaped in the crucible of the Cold war, throughout its history NATO could adapt to changing international conditions. On this foundation the Euro-Atlantic allies can develop actions and plans to counter rising tensions and threats.

NATO remains the bedrock of security for its members. But only if NATO is able further to adapt to a changing security environment will it be maintained as a most effective and flexible politico-military instrument for the benefit of all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, history had taught that the fates of Europe and America are intertwined. If the transatlantic bargain is to remain strong, a re-balancing of responsibilities is necessary. The Europeans have become more important allies and partners. While NATO remains central in the member-states' efforts to maintain security

and stability, the benefits and strengths of all other Euro-Atlantic organizations have to be utilized.¹⁹⁴

NATO is not an end in itself. It is the main vehicle to create a system of cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area and it can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice, and stability in the wider international system. The 1991 Alliance's New Strategic Concept has provided the inspiration for NATO initiatives throughout the 1990s, such as the NACC, the PfP, the EAPC, the PJC (Permanent Joint Council) with Russia, and the open door policy – giving life to the Allies goal to promote dialogue and cooperation. The vital partnership programs must be given a high priority. They offer means and ways to promote development in security and stability. Furthermore, cooperation with Russia should move beyond arms control to a qualitatively new level of political and military relationship.

NATO's strength is to shape the security situation instead of maintaining a status quo. NATO must continue to reach out by opening Alliance structures to cooperation, seeking to develop mutual understanding and cooperation with willing partners in strategically critical regions bordering the Alliance members. The enlargement process will be critical proof of NATO's determination to build European security system that is inclusive and stabilizing.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Rudolf Scharping, A Security Agenda for Europe and North America, 8 March 1999, available (online): <www.nato50otan.org/index2.htm> [March 2000]

¹⁹⁵ "We are an Alliance whose success rests on its credibility - strong, effective military capabilities and a rock-solid security guarantee. Enlargement must add to our security and promote greater stability not only to the territories of the new invitees, but through them to neighboring regions. ... There is a simple strategic rationale behind the Madrid decision. By enlarging in this way, we increase NATO's strength. And by increasing NATO's strength - without sacrificing its cohesiveness - we can increase

The U.S. commitment to and a leading role in the Alliance will remain the critical factor to NATO's future viability, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Security threats and tensions arising in Europe are of transatlantic concern. The interdependencies that exist between the U.S. and Europe guarantee efforts of synchronization to counter the problems of concern. All NATO members accepted that future challenges could not be solved by one nation. This is the basis for consensus and solidarity. However, the global view on security matters of the U.S., on the one hand, and the more regional focus of the other NATO member-states, on the other, will lead to false expectations by the junior partners as well as the alliance leader. The problem will be to find common solutions for problems that are not life-threatening to the members. The UNPROFOR record should be a reminder of what can happen if the Allies are blocked by dissent about ways and means to solve the rising problem. The situation in the Balkans and the basic reasons of the new Allies for joining NATO have made it clear that without a strong U.S. commitment to Europe, NATO's goals could not be achieved. The enhanced U.S. policy to find ways for improving the cooperation with the European Allies is a strong stabilizing signal for all partners.

Collective defense against an attack on any Alliance member remains the cornerstone of the Alliance. Additionally, NATO must set the stage for outer core, non-Article 5 missions. These missions should become more developed with the goal to diminish the chance of an outbreak of collective defense missions. The existing collective defense capabilities will provide the framework for the mission spectrum. If

the sum total of stability across Europe, and thus our own security." in: Javier Solana, in: The Challenge

the Alliance is to preserve a degree of unity of purpose in the new security environment, the Allies will have to reform NATO's approach to military cooperation. They will have to share, not divide, burdens and responsibilities for a credible response to the security challenges.¹⁹⁶

In order to ensure the success of the Alliance, it is essential that no rivalry between NATO and the EU about security arrangements begin to water down the cohesion in the Alliance. It is essential that the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy complement rather than duplicate NATO efforts and institutions, that the processes are adjusted to each other, and that the issue of membership and non-membership in the different organizations is solved. Therefore, the process of ESDI needs to be managed in such a way that it does not strengthen those forces on both sides of the Atlantic that want a de-coupling of the U.S. from Europe.

ESDI is the central means to introduce the European nations to a more credible commitment to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Although the sharing of responsibility is still central and should not be violated, the European national defense efforts have to be better coordinated. The Europeans should concentrate on developing forces and capabilities to implement the goals of defense cooperation. Europe's unwillingness to spend more on defense and the announcement of the EU nations to build up a 60.000 soldier rapid reaction force arouses the suspicion of the U.S., which asks why Europeans want to reach goals in the EU that they have been unable to meet within NATO.

of NATO Enlargement, edited by Anton A. Bebler, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 1999, pp. 3-4

Nonetheless the U.S. should support these efforts with more than lip service, even in the case of new discussions about force postures and NATO's command structure in the European theater. To the benefit of all, the defense planning process will be better coordinated and goals and means will fit better together. What has to be avoided is the creation of new, but unnecessary, institutions with no real improvements, or even deterioration, in European capabilities, especially if these developments are taking place in a spirit of competition with the Alliance, which would raise American suspicion about European intentions.¹⁹⁷

NATO's trustful political consultation process has been proved several times in the last five decades. The military competence is undisputed and the transatlantic link is a strong means to streamline national efforts. This unique combination makes NATO a major player in reshaping security. Bosnia and Kosovo are the foremost examples, emphasizing that no organization of sovereign states can function any more effectively than the consensus among its member-states permits. NATO has to act in concert with other organizations and with respect to their principles and purposes.¹⁹⁸ Here, the transatlantic relationship and NATO's rule of consultation have paid off. Without NATO's military clout, there would have been no Dayton agreement [1995], and without

¹⁹⁶ Stanley R. Sloan, Proposal: Beyond Collective Defense, in: McNair Paper Number 46 Chapter 5, January 1996, available (online): <www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair46/m046ch05.html> [March 2000]

¹⁹⁷ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Special Reports, ESDI Steering Group, Madrid, 17 December 1999, available (online): <www.naa.be/publications/special/at10esdi002.html> [March 2000]

¹⁹⁸ Strobe Talbott, The New Europe and the New NATO, Address to the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn, Germany, 4 February 1999, available (online): <www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/newnato.htm> [March 2000]

NATO's PfP-arrangements there would not be thirty nations, including Russia, participating in the IFOR/SFOR operation. NATO has become an instrument for shaping Euro-Atlantic security — a catalyst for a broader security order. NATO must continue to be the sole instrument for dealing with territorial defense, but it must also be the preferred instrument for dealing with many lesser crises.

Transparency in NATO's defense planning will remain a crucial factor as well. The members can demonstrate that they take their individual and collective security responsibility seriously and it will provide the opportunity to hint at national shortcomings that limit NATO's ability to fulfill its mission. Even in the absence of major threats, the political leaders must be aware that cutting budgets will diminish prudent defense efforts, which helps to deter future threats and supports NATO's activities dealing with current challenges.

Nuclear weapons remain a component of NATO strategy. However, without an active threat and a clear operational need/use, without a common perception of the need of nuclear weapons, the specific purpose of deterrent effect is questionable. NATO should continue to promote a progressive international policy of reduction of nuclear weapons and they should make them safer. NATO should use its means to encourage non-proliferation, arms control, and arms reduction efforts.

The NATO story continues to demonstrate how truly remarkable the organization is in the history of international organizations. The last NATO decade has been rich in attempts to create new channels of discussion and influence to win new partners and friends and to overcome public criticism at home. Clear and remarkable is that NATO is

not just a collection of potential vetoes, as some characterize the OSCE, or a standing forum for diplomats arguing about global issues, as some characterize the UN. It is an organization that works.¹⁹⁹

NATO will as usual muddle through. Policy will define a state of institutional inertia, with changes as must be and adaptations at some rate to further changes we cannot foresee at present. Others posit NATO's uniqueness as also reason alone for survival, relying on a primitive cost-benefit calculation that cooperation is less costly than unilateralism, and probably less politically risky as well. Neither argument, obviously, is sufficient. However, the results of the past decade against what seemed unfavorable odds are impressive and reflect more than simple survival or an unexpected competitive edge over other parts of European security architecture. The flexibility and the willingness to continue to commit attention and resources shown by member states bode as well as does the expression of interest in and association by emerging states.²⁰⁰

The organization appears to be the only one, capable of dealing with the current and future risks, challenges, and transition processes. It is multinational, integrated, strategically and operationally effective, and available for political leaders to support all political efforts the member nations agree upon. NATO has entered the 21st century as an Alliance in transition, but its basic ideals are the same. All members, applicants, as well as partners are aware of the benefits they can gain from membership and cooperation. The latest Strategic Concept, as all the other Strategic Concepts, changed the course of NATO and could strengthen the ties between the European and the North American

¹⁹⁹ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, NATO at Fifty: Challenges, Historic Tasks, in: USIA Electronic Journal, vol. 4, No.1, March 1999, available (online): <www.usia.gov/journals/ijpe/pj19kell.htm> [March 2000]

²⁰⁰ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, NATO at Fifty: Challenges, Historic Tasks, in: USIA Electronic Journal, vol. 4, No.1, March 1999, available (online): <www.usia.gov/journals/ijpe/pj19kell.htm> [March 2000]

nations. Public and parliamentary support is still backing the organization, its missions, and its goals. The Alliance's Strategic Concept and the other additional final Summit documents are a broad basis for NATO's future relevance.

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